HYPOTHESES ON THE STRUCTURE OF HISTORY


Based on the Example of Six Major Nations



I. The Community and Historical Cycles

The history of peoples in this book is considered through the prism of the following hypotheses:

- people as large groups are capable of understanding the essence of things, of consolidating and achieving success by two means: traditional (communal) and new (communal-social).

The communal means of understanding and consolidating is a distinctive ritual action that puts people in a certain state (one could say, trance) as a result of which the unconscious of many is united into a single whole, gods become "real" and a "revelation" occurs.  By this means people create and re-create basic religious (mythological) values and systems that correctly answer all questions of existence.

Individualism (the collective-social means) gets answers by using abstract concepts, by analyzing experience and synthesizing experiential-practical, philosophical, scientific and ideological systems.  In this case people achieve consolidation by joining into collectives and societies.  People united by ideological, scientific, and philosophical systems and views make up collectives. People united by affairs, interests and hierarchies make up societies.

The collective means that has existed for hundreds of thousands of years has been pushed out in the last millennium by individualistic means yet continues to occupy the most important place in the history of humankind and peoples.

-the life cycle of a specific super-community, be it a people, the Church, or other relatively isolated and independent community uniting large groups of people is 768 years (3x4x4x4x4). At the end of this period the community (super-community) either dies out or is reincarnated.

-religion is a rational system, a means of existence and development for such a super-community.  The main dogma is the ideological key to religious understanding of the world, the system of super-authorities that attaches capricious individualism to the collective understanding of life.

- the collective "I" is no less real than the individual "I." It acts, thinks and exists apart from our individual "I"s. It “creeps" unbidden into the individual unconscious of people and disposes as it sees fit with this unconscious during religious and other community rituals; it is God.  This is why God is real but he is not in our habits, but in our subcortexes; his arms and legs are our arms and legs.  There is no God outside the human species if we are talking about the biblical God.

- no one knows, nor can they predict the future more accurately than the super-community and even this community cannot see further than 700 years into the future.  People capable of extracting information from the collective "I" (from God) such as Nostradamus can fairly accurately predict basic historical tendencies and even events 400-600 years in advance. Such people create a "vision," i.e. they can see the future as if through a dark glass, as opposed to the immediate and accurate foreknowledge of the Collective God.

- the history of a country and people is considered as the history of its Spirit, which is the true "I" of the collective consciousness of the main ethnic group of this country and which goes through a process of birth ("death-birth" or reincarnation), development and dissemination among the people representing this group; transformation into a harmonious system of social relationships; aging and degradation in order to die and come to life again.

What will this theory lead to (not the book but the theory itself in the process of development)?

- to the creation of a scientific theory of religions and the history of peoples, to a scientific basis for the completely necessary and unique role of religion and mythology in the life of humankind.

- to the creation of a practical theory that will supplant the currently dominant extrapolative view of history that since things have gotten better they will become even better.

What were the results?

The histories of six nations were analyzed:

- the history of Russia in recent centuries is considered as the history of the development of three basic values: adaptation (patience), freedom and a strong tsar, and the religious essence of the "Russian idea" is the distant God the Father and a Christ who moves between God and the devil.  The future lies in the “landing” or "becoming Chinese" of God the Father.

- the history of Germany in recent centuries is considered as the history of the main Protestant nation that for the first time put to God the Father behind the son and made work the true measure of all things.  The near future does not look good for Germany.

-the history of France in recent centuries is considered as the history of a culture in which God the Father and God the Son are practically equal and autonomous super-authorities and, for this reason, the nation's history resembles that of a courtesan. In the future it would be nice see the return to of the currently soured "light," "cynical" and Rabelaisian French spirit.

- the history of the United States is considered as the history of the double triumph of individualism.  The near future looks good but America runs the risk of "spoiling" her personality.

- the history of Italy is considered from the time of ancient Rome. "Coquettish" French Catholicism didn't make it here. The Italians failed to become "economic" people like the Germans, nor did they become a "political" people like the French, rather they kept their own family-oriented and clan-based community.  Italy should prepare for skyrocketing success on the European horizon.

- the history of China is examined from the age of Confucius. China gradually grew from a family community to a rural community, then became a provincial community.  China will soar and expand on the Eurasian continent.

Later I would also like to examine the history of such interesting nations as Great Britain, India, Spain, Greece, Iran, Japan, Turkey and Egypt, as well as the history of world religions through the prism of this theory. 

II. Historical Cycles

It is common knowledge that history is cyclical, and it doesn’t matter whether the model is a circle or a spiral; both models are too simple to exceed common sense with such sayings as “history repeats itself” and “everything flows, everything changes.”

But the cyclical nature of History is not repetitive, nor is it closed or revolving around itself. Rather, it has a “seasonal” nature characterized by the rise and fall of activity, by periods of integration and disintegration. The main vector of History is aimed upward, but the movement itself goes in waves.

I will not delve into the basis for the diagrams presented below since I consider that the historical descriptions using these diagrams will serve as the best proof or disproof of the theory.

Let’s take a three-year period as the “atom” of historical cycles (although nine months, the gestation period for a human organism, could also be taken as this unit), then obtain cycles through multiplication by four. Thus we obtain the 12-year cycle (let’s call it the “micro-cycle”), the 48-year cycle (the “short” cycle), the 192-year cycle (the “medium” cycle), and the 768-year cycle (the “long” cycle). There could be other historical cycles, but let’s take the 768-year cycle as the largest.

Each cycle contains four preceding cycles which, as will become clear from the ensuing discussion, can be conveniently referred to as “summer,” “autumn,” “winter” and “spring.” There is some sense to this.

The cycle (any cycle) can be represented graphically in the form of a sinusoid whose Y-axis will measure the so-far unclear concept of the “cumulative spiritual force of the cultural commonality of people” and the X-axis will represent time.

The cumulative spiritual force of a cultural community or, more precisely, the super-community of people which for the sake of brevity we will refer to as the “force of national spirit,” the “national spirit” or the “national idea,” etc. in the same vein, is not something mystical. It depends on how purposefully humans act in all meaningful life situations, to what extent their diverse goals are integrated into a general national goal and, respectively (as a result), among each other and, finally, to what extent national goals suit the material basis and surrounding environment. If all of this is tied into a unified system, then the “cultural community” (nation, country) moves toward power and wealth. If there is dissonance, then the process flounders. If this dissonance becomes total discord then the nation loses its face, loses its independence or simply perishes.

Another hypothesis is that nations develop idealistically, in other words, at first an idea appears (or perhaps it would be better to say “revelation”). This idea arises in the minds of men and in the unconscious of a few groups of people but thanks to its timeliness and necessity at that particular moment, it quickly becomes understood among the broad group of the educated elite. Norms and values begin to be generated very quickly, former values are regulated and refined and, as a result, a new version of the national spirit arises. This version is not speculative, but concrete and not only ideological or verbal but pervades the entire symbolism of behavior using non-verbal and symbolic means of information. Then these forms penetrate into the broader layers of the population, accumulate social details, beliefs and myths and directly affect the behavior of masses of people. Then they lead to a confrontation with out-dated concepts and defeat them through cultural, social, economic and political reforms. Then these forms become outmoded and come to resemble those very outdated concepts that begin to undermine the material basis of society and its spiritual commonality. Finally “winter” comes and the people, as led by their “best representatives,” begin the tortuous search for new ideas, a new means of synchronizing traditions and modernity.

Here’s another hypothesis: the space on the diagram fairly accurately reflects the dependence of the “material” force of a culture (people, country) on the condition of the national spirit itself. During the “summer” and “autumn” this force increases, and during the “winter” and “spring” it decreases. But during the “summer” the “material” force is augmented while in the “autumn” it drops off (i.e. a crisis in the second derivative), during the “winter” there is a rapid and accelerating drop and during the “spring” the decrease in force reverses itself even to the point of growth.

“Material” force of spiritual commonality is understood not as material wealth and military might proper, but as the degree of forethought and complexity of “intellectual property” of political, legal, economic and social systems and, in general, that which in Marxism is called production and superstructural relations. In other words, it is the ability of economic systems to produce material wealth, of social systems to distribute created wealth, and of political systems to craft state power, including military might. I would consider art and religion separately. Art, as a rule, summarizes the results of the "spring-summer” period. Art flourishes in the “autumn,” and religion, as a rule, forges ahead, discovering new formulae for the national spirit during the "winter.” But these are nuances, and the following text should be clear enough.

The same diagram may be used to explain the “medium,” “short” and “micro-cycle” but the “seasons” will mean something different here.

III. Long Cycles

A “long cycle” is a cycle of the development of the national spirit and at the same time a cycle of the growth and decline of a nation’s “material” power.

A “long summer” may be called an institutional or anti-institutional period (dialectics!). A “long summer” is a period during which, as a result of previous development, the country is “materially” relatively weak, but is spiritually strong and united. New values have become generally accepted. This has fueled the optimism and the activity (spiritual force) of the majority of people and communities in this country, at the same time boosting the degree of their solidarity and their ability to combine their efforts for the good of the country as a whole. “Material” power, by the way, is sufficient to undertake expansion, whether of the aggressive type or relying on the extension of political influence. People’s energy is overflowing, and the country’s influence quickly grows. The country undergoes serious and, most importantly, successful reforms: political, economic, military and social.

A “long autumn” can be called a “material period.” A “long autumn” begins at the peak of military might, but official ideology has already fossilized, just as many popular habits. This can already be seen in development rates. A certain distance arises between the national spirit and daily life which only grows with time. The national mentality (i.e. what the nation thinks about itself) and objective characteristics also begin to grow apart (foreigners may note such qualities as complacency, lack of self-criticism, etc.). An expansionist (outwardly aggressive) mood appears in society since there is a temptation to test one’s might as power to halt the already initiated process of one’s own disintegration and spiritual decline. “Summer” and “spring” aggression are merry and dashing (in some difficult cases “schizophrenic”), whereas “autumn” aggression is malevolent and hard-hitting, even paranoid.

During the “autumn” all these problems only get worse, the “material” basis begins to disintegrate, but during the “Indian summer,” i.e. during the early “autumn” there is a miraculous flourishing of the arts, great literature is penned, art painted, etc. This period is typified not by separate bright individual geniuses, but by an entire succession of geniuses supported by hundreds and thousands of talented masters. It is possible that this heyday not only summarizes previous periods (almost 400 years of development), but is also often compensatory. Artists and musicians seek new ways of developing the nation, they “patch holes” in the national spirit, but only in part since the discoveries of art cannot be compared in terms of significance to religious discoveries. But if the country is at such a time possessed by an expansionist mood, then the creative energy of geniuses is directed not toward art, but into science, organization and careers. Geniuses who have not accepted the rules of the game of society “obsessed” by expansion either perish on their own or are killed.

The “large winter” may be called a “spiritual period” or the “cynical” period since the decline of the old spirit is accompanied by the birth of a new spirit. The “long winter” brings frost and, although the level of national wealth is high, the structure is fossilized, contains a lot of “garbage,” the absolute decay of the “material” culture begins; it starts to become more primitive, loses its quality and responsibility. All of this is accompanied by obvious signs of decreasing solidarity among people and communities. Society actively disintegrates according to all parameters except, perhaps, the spiritual element, but the growth of spirituality in one part of society is typical for the latter half of this “winter.” Here the veil gradually drops: the authority of institutions is undermined, cynicism spreads in society, but at the same time there is space for new ideas and spiritual quests. At the end of this period a new national idea appears, and not only an idea, but an entire values system. An elite sharing this system of values is formed. At the peak of this period (“the medium winter of the long winter”) communities on the lower order are freed from control over the national super-community and the larger of these may become “I”-nations themselves.

During this period the country is weakest against outside aggression and domestic conflict, especially since the material, tangible wealth is still quite large; there is “plenty to go around.” And this is what people do: they share by robbing the weak. The “winter” may also be a mild one if neighbors are quiet or a civilized neighbor has established his political dominance in the country, at the same time artificially integrating the country and hindering destructive phenomena in the society itself. A “very harsh winter” threatens the disappearance of a people, and in the best case scenario, the newfound national spirit and acquired values will contain in themselves a “time bomb” and an “inferiority complex” that in the future will create problems for the country and its neighbors.

A “long spring” may be called a “popular period” and just as easily an “anti-popular” period since the people suffer to such a degree. A “long spring” begins during the period of the greatest decline of the people’s spiritual culture (but not that of the new elite). The country is internally disintegrated and poor, but falls under the power of a joyful spiritual light. This spirit can quite appropriately be compared to the mood and smells of an early spring. The people are again full of hope and unclear but joyous anticipation. The nation begins to undergo a spiritual rebirth. More and more people accept the new values, religious and far-reaching social reforms occur.

At the end of the “spring” the country may be even weaker in material terms than at the beginning. There are good prospects for future growth, people are full of optimism and strength. Even wars and discord cannot interfere with the dynamics of this growth, destroying material values, bringing ruin to people, but they do not destroy and only reinforce the “material” systems, including social and economic institutions. They reinforce people’s spiritual powers, bearing—as strange as it may sound—a kind of festive, carnival element (remember the phrase “revolutions are history’s holidays”), thus even in a sea of blood fortifying the spirit and optimism. The people seek answers to questions and find them; the adversities do not paralyze, but are understood as lessons for the future.

If we again attempt to answer the question of what is a “long cycle,” then the answer could read as follows: it is a cycle during which the cultural commonality of people and communities adapts itself to the new reality of the material world and the reality of other surrounding cultures and, at the same time, the cycle during which this environment is transformed and remade to fit the major culture’s values.

IV. Medium Cycles

“Medium cycles,” just as “long” cycles consist of four “seasons.”

A “medium summer” may also be called a “harmonious period” in the development of the national spirit, but in each of the “big seasons” this harmony has a different meaning. During a “long summer,” material and “material” wealth grow more intensively, and at the same time the spiritual development slows and, for a certain time, these processes proceed at the same rate; this is where the idea of “harmony” arises. The period of a “long autumn” is the “Indian summer” of spiritual discoveries and the “Boldino summer” of the arts. The period of a “long winter” is an intensive imitation of the external phenomena of other cultures and active adaptation to neighboring cultures. The period of a “long spring” offers the most intense dispersion of new values among the people and is signified by the rebirth of popular ethics.

A “medium autumn” may be called a “reformist period.” During the period of a “long summer” we see the most intensive creation of new economic, social and political institutions. During the period of a “long autumn” we can observe the profound reform of social institutions. During a “long winter” almost all spheres of life witness considerable disarray. During the period of a “long spring” the internal unity of the people is rejuvenated based on new spiritual foundations.

A “medium winter” can be called a “crisis period.” During the period of a “long summer” the phenomenon according to which the authorities “take advantage” of the people is typical, in other words, the rich and titled have become so jaded in their wealth that they begin to go mad. However, political disturbances do not stop development, but only slow it slightly. On the whole, people’s activity is easily funneled into those spheres of public life in which social and individual interests correspond. During the period of a “long autumn” as a rule false reforms are carried out quite decisively and lead to grave consequences. During the period of a “long winter” the country and society experience a peak of disintegration but the spiritual elite has already found the path to salvation. During the period of a “long spring,” development takes on such a tumultuous character than more often than not it leads to chaos and temporary destabilization in public life. The new national spirit now gives birth to mass and cruel fanaticism for the first time.

A “medium spring” may be called a “period of insight.” During the period of a “long summer” this is the most beautiful and richest period. During the period of a “long autumn” nations experience a “return to origins.” During the period of a “long winter” spiritual insight occurs and the national spirit is formed. During the period of a “long spring” we see the development of all forms of public life and a dynamic evolution of new institutions. The turbulent flow again becomes streamlined.

To sum up, let’s formulate the essence of the “medium cycle”: from harmony to reform (dynamization), then to crisis and, further, to insight (return of harmony). In contrast to the long cycle defined as a “life cycle” of the national spirit (a concrete form), the medium cycle is a cycle during which the national spirit is active, and we can say that this is the cycle during which the national spirit is adjusted.

V. Short Cycles and Micro-cycles

A detailed examination of the “short cycle” will require a study of not 16 combinations, but 64. That could become tedious. It would be better if we carry out this task not abstractly, but rather with concrete examples considering the history of one country or another. So for the sake of clarity we will say here that the “short cycle” is a life-cycle of a concrete “material” political-economic-social doctrine such as Bolshevism-Stalinism or the “social market economy.”

The “micro-cycle” is a cycle of activity of the “material doctrine.” It is a cycle of activity in the realization of a unified system of views of the society of the future and the society of the present. But this system is not an all-embracing religious values system whose development occurs only within the development of the “long cycle.”

“Long” or “medium” cycles serve the religious values system and “short” and “micro” cycles serve the material and spiritual system of a lower order which represents a system of social-economic-political paradigms.

Let us complete the theoretical part on this note and proceed to the applied part of the discussion.

VI. An Attempt to Peer into Russia’s Future

Let us imagine a chain of “long seasons” in Russian history:

 

661 spring 853 summer 1045 autumn 1237 winter 1429 spring 1621 summer 1813 autumn 2005 winter 2197

 

There is a methodical problem connected with selecting the nodal point, the point of reference. This is a separate problem that has not been fully solved here. Let’s leave this problem for another study.

The medieval Russian ethos was formed between 661 and 853; between 853 and 1045 the medieval Russian state was formed; the period between 1045 and 1237 saw increased disintegration; 1237-1429 was the period of the Mongol yoke, and in 1429-1621 the new Russia formed around Moscow and became a large and powerful state. Between 1621 and 1813 Russia gained imperial grandeur and undertook modernization (the reforms of Peter the Great). Between 1813 and 2005 Russia created a unique civilization that claimed to have a special mission in the world, attempted to create a world empire, but gradually saw her spiritual forces and material achievements eroded.

What next? A new yoke? Decay? Internal enslavement of Russians by one of the “minor” peoples of Russia, for example, by the Tatars? In any case, the “winter period” now underway will bring the unavoidable loss of the country’s positions around the world, as well as internal disintegration of people and communities. The country is getting lost, has become frozen and, in the worst case scenario, if we attempt to behave as if this were “autumn,” then we could fall under foreign influence or even “dissolve” or break up into warring spiritual communities. But it is this time that will give birth to the new “I” of the Russian nation.

Let’s analyze the next “long cycle” by uniting it with the “medium” cycle:

 

1621

   long summer

1813

1621

summer

1669

autumn

1717

winter

1765

spring

1813

 

1813

   long autumn

2005

1813

summer

1861

autumn

1909

winter

1957

spring

2005

 

2005

   long winter

2197

2005

summer

2053

autumn

2101

winter

2149

spring

2197

 

Between 1621 and 1669 the country developed quickly and harmoniously after throwing off the Mongol yoke. Between 1669 and 1717 the question of modernization was raised and solved in true Russian style (the Petrine reforms), but a period of “German hegemony” began. Between 1717 and 1765 German power over the state was practically absolute (German rulers, Germans in the army, sciences and bureaucracy). Between 1765 and 1813 a new elite was forming, the Russians were becoming “European” and the Germans were “Russifying.” During this period we saw the glorious reigns of Catherine II and Alexander I, Russia’s entrance into the European arena and seventy victories by Suvorov’s army, not to mention the defeat of Napoleon.

Between 1813 and 1861 the country gained supremacy in Europe, strengthened her positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as in the Far East. This period saw the Golden Age of Russian literature. Of course this period ended poorly with defeat in the Crimean War and the tsar’s suicide. The preceding modernization of the state and the elite strictly posed the question of modernization of the entire people.

Between 1861 and 1909 the task of modernizing the social and economic systems, i.e. the “material” bases of the popular lifestyle was solved. This was the period during which serfdom (slavery) was outlawed, and military and legal reforms were accomplished. The period ends with the first Russian revolution and forced political reform. The modernization was generally successful, but only according to the narrow canons of economic and socio-political logic (economic growth and growth of freedoms) since the deep foundations of the popular lifestyle (national spirit) were exploded. The success of the reforms was accompanied not by a weakening, but by a sharp growth of social tension, increase of revolutionary mood (from the People’s Will to the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks), the growth of convulsive decadent moods and the decay of the elite (the phenomenon of Rasputin’s following says it all). The country gradually became a victim of her own reforms and the imperial idea that had been cherished by the Russian elite for the preceding 200 years.

Between 1909 and 1957, Russia “went for broke.” This was the start of the self-destructive First World War, followed by social revolution, then world revolution. The imperial idea, when it took on forms of the idea of world revolution instead of the expected rebirth of the national spirit, killed this spirit if not conclusively (which could only have been accomplished by killing 4/5 of the population and assimilating the rest), then at least by destroying the majority of its “material” carriers in the form, primarily, of the old peasant and Cossack ways of life. Instead of an organic peasant community, a distorted camp-style “commonality” appeared. In exchange for the partial loss of her own culture, Russia not only preserved her empire, but even expanded it (the social commonwealth). At one time it seemed that Russia was close to single rule over all of Eurasia, but that was only a mirage.

Between 1957 and 2005 Russia’s main task was to “lick the wounds” received during the preceding period, but this turned into a constant retreat from her positions: from dropping the idea of world revolution (“invasion of the West”) and joining European countries to the Soviet Union, to the Hungarian, then Czech, then Polish “events” and, finally, to the so-called Velvet Revolution of the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in the early 1990s with the threat of Russia herself falling apart in the early twenty-first century.

We have ahead of us a “medium summer of a long winter,” i.e. a period during which the country’s national spirit will become weaker than the “world spiritual field.” This could bring much grief to the country, especially since the nation has been weakened by the foregoing century of fierce struggle for Eurasian empire. Intuitively, Russia must make the following choice: to accept the best elements created by other cultures, but not everything… only that which is most acceptable to the Russian people. Now Russia must behave as a person who has been weakened by a grave illness, i.e. she needs to move slowly and carefully, leaning on a cane. Any quick move could cause her to fall.

Even with a “mild winter” Russia should expect a slight drop in influence in the world and to gain the reputation of a weak country. It is possible that social relations will be harmonized if it becomes possible to entrench the democratic regime achieved through the suffering of the last 200 years. The country seems to be losing her face, will become more down-to-earth and mediocre like a huge provincial area. Within the country peoples of the “long summer” will gain increasing importance, such as Tatars and other Turkish peoples. Probably the Eurasian idea will spread. This is an idea according to which Russian culture will be interpreted as a younger sibling to Turkish culture and many Russians will even agree, i.e. the old complex will move from the aggressive phase to a masochistic phase. But gradually between 2100 and 2150 a process of spiritual synthesis will get underway, leading to the spiritual rebirth of individual groups of Russians. Between 2150 and 2200 Russia will again receive her own prophet, a new Sergii of Radonezh, just as in the particularly harsh “winter” of the Mongol yoke at the end of the fourteenth century.

Now let’s take a look at the “short cycles” in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries:

 

1909

  medium winter

1957

1909

summer

1921

autumn

1933

winter

1945

spring

1957

 

1957

  medium spring

2005

1957

summer

1969

autumn

1981

winter

1993

spring

2005

 

2005

  medium summer

2053

2005

summer

2017

autumn

2029

winter

2041

spring

2053

 

Between 1909 and 1921 we saw the “magic transformation” of the imperial idea into the Bolshevik idea. The country gained a new official ideology and, along with it, a goal and reason for existence and development. The state consolidates, the people unite, but the false idea “drains” them and destroys the basic values of popular existence. By the way, this is just the beginning of the process. This is characteristic for the start of a “medium winter of a long autumn,” i.e. activity, aggression of outward forms of culture and fading of internal forms, a characteristic dictatorship of ideology over values, and a distortion of the essence of the national spirit.

Between 1921 and 1933 we saw a “short autumn.” The new ideology saturated itself and became fossilized by the time it was already openly consuming human lives and ancient traditions and the foundations of existence. Romantically cruel Bolshevism turned into nothing more than cruel, paranoid Stalinism.

Between 1933 and 1945 Russia underwent a “freezing” of the Communist idea in Stalin’s version, which would take on finished socio-economic-political forms and would die out almost completely as an ideology. It was no coincidence that Stalin at the start of the war appealed to nationalism and to the Russians’ national sentiment, just as the ensuing dissolution of this nationalism was no accident. It was the third international. The great war was won not by Bolshevism, but in spite of it. It was Russian nationalism that won the war.

Between 1945 and 1957 there was a “spring” of the simple and hobbled idea of destalinization.

Between 1957 and 1969 Russia saw the idea of destalinization lead to a real “thaw,” which at the end of this period became someone else’s “Prague Spring.” In place of an “order of swordsmen” oriented toward world revolution, we see so-called “real socialism” oriented toward maintaining international positions and improving the life of the nomenklatura. The country was entering into a stage of decay. In essence, Stalinist Bolshevism was already dead and fit into the years 1909-1957. The new period was the “wound-licking” period during which the domestic foundations of the national spirit were restored at the same time that outward forms were deconstructed, i.e. the forms of the Stalinist system. At the same time, a more global process was also going on: the old Russian imperial idea was waning.

During the period 1969-1981 the romantic “thaw” became the dry and stagnant “real socialism” in all its “beauty”: corruption, hypocrisy and the mediocrity of all undertakings. At the same time, but in broader but quite popular layers of the intelligentsia, people began to recognize the historical dead-end and the need for far-reaching socio-economic and political reforms that would fix Stalin’s mistakes. The Russians quickly lost their authority among smaller nations, especially the “spring” Turkish peoples (they never had any authority over the Baltic nations). The nationalism of these nations grows along with their influence on the affairs of the Soviet state.

1981-1993 was the perestroika era, followed by the destruction of the entire system created during the previous decades. The real basis of this system, it seemed, was not just the party, but also the system of soviets; in 1993 this system was destroyed in the wake of the events of October of that year.

The period from 1993 to 2005, just as all “spring” periods, belongs equally to the past and the future. This is a period of fierce struggle between the old and the new: between the remaining traces of “real socialism,” i.e. the Russian Communist party, the “red directors,” leftist populism on the one hand, and the liberals engaged in privatization, the “new Russians” and the oligarchs (financial and raw materials barons) on the other. At the end of this romantic period a Russian-style capitalism will take root, and the face of this system will be intelligent. Russian capitalism will be not a predatory system, but a ravaging state-oriented capitalism, and it will not be effective. The “long winter” is a bad time to grow flowers outside.

The period between 2005 and 2017 will be the “summer” of oligarchy capitalism, the period of its development and gradual fossilization. The political system will become stricter and more autocratic. Economic policy will be oriented toward major corporations and monopolies.

The period between 2017 and 2029 will be a period during which the oligarchic capitalist system decays and a period of possible political liberalization. But during this period the country will once again risk losing her territorial integrity. Most likely she will overcome this danger, but the danger itself will lead to a growth in militarism and further fossilization of the system. Moreover, the influence of China will rapidly grow, having during the preceding period linked Russia’s economy to her own.

The period between 2029 and 2041 will be the most dangerous time for the territorial integrity of Russia during the first half of the twenty-first century. This will be the start of the end of oligarch capitalism. In Russia the interests of the “autumn” and “summer” Atlantic powers (Germany, Great Britain and the United States) and the interests of the “summer” China will clash. If political stability prevails, the next period will be not only a period during which economic and some political independence is lost, but also a period of political and economic liberalization. In general, this will be a “mild winter.” Later on, the course of this “winter” will depend greatly on European and Chinese processes and on European-Chinese cooperation.

Finally, let us examine the “micro-cycles” of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries:

 

1981

  short winter

1993

1981

summer

1984

autumn

1987

winter

1990

spring

1993

 

1993

  short spring

2005

1993

summer

1996

autumn

1999

winter

2010

spring

2005

 

2005

  short summer

2017

2005

summer

2008

autumn

2011

winter

2014

spring

2017

 

Between 1981 and 1984 the idea that “we can’t live this way” spread in society, leading to the idea of complete destalinization and perestroika. Between 1984 and 1987 the idea of perestroika was extruded and became policy, from the anti-alcohol campaign that was an indirect protest against the “abominations” of real socialism, to “picking up the pace” that became a confession of our qualitative lag behind the West, then to glasnost (openness) that gave a direct mandate to political liberalization and the dismissal of the party nomenklatura from power. Between 1987 and 1990 the idea of perestroika bore a rich harvest in all forms of public activity, including economic and political liberalization, and the socialist bloc disintegrated, leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. Between 1990 and 1993 the ideas of perestroika began to fade, and at the same time people were captivated by the ideas of liberalization in the full sense of the word, i.e. by the idea of westernizing Russia. Thus began the “victory march” of capitalism, the market and democracy.

Between 1993 and 1996 a sufficiently stable and dynamic system, and not only a liberal one, really did come into being. Politics was dominated not by democracy but by anarchy, and the economy not by the market and capitalism but by monopolies and the oligarchs, who relied not on competitive advantages, but on connections in the government. We get the first version of “Russian-style capitalism” which also has an obvious raw-materials, parasitic and rental nature. This was a freak, but an active capitalism. At that time the Russians exported to the West not only raw materials, but also their Mafia, which at first shocked even the Italian Mafia.

Between 1996 and 1999 (“autumn”) the system grew in all its “foolishness” and the rule gradually grew senile. The main parties and party blocs consolidated. The right-wingers and the communists were pushed aside by centrist formations, such as the left-centrists (Luzhkov) and the right-centrists (who don’t yet have a real leader). The country is currently undergoing a financial crisis. This brings relative relief, but not for long. The old and new oligarchs, like octopuses, are regaining complete control over the political and economic systems. Everyone’s tired of everything: capitalism, socialism, democracy, dictatorship… the country isn’t living but hanging on, suffering a kind of unpleasant procedure and attempting to think beyond the upcoming presidential elections. In foreign policy, as in domestic policy, Russia also isn’t quite right: instead of a calm and well-planned policy we have reflex actions. It’s either send the tanks into Pristina over night, or go back to begging.

What can Russia expect between 1999 and 2010? Since this is a “winter” period, the political and social activity of the protectionists will decrease, the “brown movement” will gain force, and the number of major mistakes and micro-conflicts will increase. This will be a dangerous period. Here we need decisive action of the authorities, and not “hard” or “soft” policies. The personality of the new president will be very important. Any populist will lead the country to new explosions. I hope there won’t be any “major explosion,” but a series of small ones certainly will occur. One of these explosions could be a rapid cooling down of relations with the West, or the actual start of a big Caucasus War.

Between 2010 and 2005 the “elemental oligarchic” period will come to an end, ceding to a period of the “two-headed eagle” (if Russia manages to get through the trials of 1999-2010 and doesn’t fall into the paws first of anarchy, then of the “Russian bear”). A “strong state” will establish itself. Politics and economics will take on a new purpose and meaning. Multiple reforms and “reforms” will be carried out, some of which may resemble purges. Russia will recognize her weakness and her new place in the world and will consciously reject the imperial idea. Now her elite will no longer be ashamed to recognize itself as a junior partner. But whose partner? Most likely China’s rather than Europe’s or the USA’s.

The years 2005-2008 will see the firming-up of a strong system of state-oriented capitalism. Now it will not be the oligarchs who twist the government around their fingers, but the state that will force the oligarchs to serve it. Of course there will be a lot of corruption and the country will see more powerful families in the president’s surroundings.

Between 2008 and 2011 there will be a new drop in activity and disintegration, strong opposition to the regime of the “two-headed eagle” will arise, Russian-Chinese relations will turn from harmonious and friendly to a source of irritation and a sense of national humiliation, and sympathy to the West will grow.

Between 2011 and 2014 the regime will stagnate but will attempt to survive. Political repression is possible, but the idea of liberalization and friendship with the West will become an idee fixe for a wide majority of the population. At the same time, the situation in the Caucasus could become more critical, not to mention in several of the autonomous republics. In contrast to the “winter” of 1999-2010, Russia will have “strong authorities” and a “close-knit elite” but economic and political dependence on China will become one of the main factors of foreign and domestic policy. In many ways China will now determine whether Russia will be stable or unstable.

2014-2017 will see the advent of neo-liberalism, but during this period it will remain in the opposition. The country, as before, like the Titanic, will sail the route of state-oriented economics, but the political situation will be mitigated, more guarantees will be given to medium and small private business, which in the following 10 years will ensure a good rate of growth for the economy. But the economic shocks of the late twentieth century and the conscious state control over the economy in the early twenty-first century will make Russia a “full-fledged” third-world country.

Now let’s return to theory. What is the meaning and the essence of each of these cycles? A “long cycle” can be called a “civilization” cycle. This is a cycle in the development of a concrete civilization among other civilizations, including the periods of its development, flourishing, stagnation and decay. It describes the civilization as a whole: all its movements, developments and achievements. A “medium cycle” describes the search for inner harmony in the contradiction with a search for an external compromise, and the driving force for the development of civilization lies in this contradiction. If we imagine a civilization completely isolated from the outside world, then it would be a harmonious but non-developing civilization. The most interesting thing is that with respect to culture, which is the seed and essence of civilization, the material basis is also external. Thus by developing the “material” and material basis, even an isolated culture reproduces this contradiction (here there is a complete coincidence with the views of Marx concerning the basis and superstructure).

The “medium cycle,” starting from internal and external harmony, will continue with dynamization when domestic order will be sacrificed to achieve the goal of external adaptation. The “short winter” starts with disequilibrium that becomes a distorted victory of external forms of culture over internal content and ends with “reconciliation,” “return to origins” and a new equilibrium.

The “short cycle” is a cycle for the development and waning of the fundamental politico-economic-social concept which “materializes” national values.

The “micro-cycle” is a cycle of activity in the establishment of this concept; it is a cycle of the elite, which according to its convictions brings the concept to life. For example, 1909-1921 was the “Leninist” period, the period of romantic communism; 1921-1933 saw the period of Stalin’s “swordsmen”; 1933-1945 was the period of Stalin’s soldiers; 1945-1957 was the period of “clever foxes” who managed to survive repression and adapt themselves to Stalin’s hierarchy; 1957-1969 was Khruschev’s experimental period; 1969-1981 can be called the Brezhnev (corrupt) period; 1981-1993 was the Gorbachev (talkative) period, and 1993-2005 the Yeltsin (confused) period. Each period saw a radical change in the ruling elite. The fact that the periods don’t correspond exactly to the terms of office of particular people is indicative of the fact that this theory cannot be understood as a literal, “hand-holding” theory. In this application (the theory of micro-cycles) the theory speaks of the power of major groups of people and moods dominating them. Especially since any “spring” also belongs to the periods ending and beginning, i.e. 1930-1933 is the period during which the “swordsmen” (i.e. those who fought to defend the Leninist-Stalinist ideals) and the “soldiers” met (the latter were pawns intended to unquestioningly carry out Stalin’s orders).

Let’s try to predict the history of the “long Russian winter” of 2005-2197. During the “golden half-century” 2005-2053 Russia will integrate herself into the world economy, but will integrate not as a leader, but as a dependent country. Moreover, the living conditions in the country will be worse than in most of the neighboring countries. The mobility of the population and capital during this time will increase throughout the world and, since Russia will lose in terms of level and quality of life, there will be a mass exodus of people from the country which will depend little on political and economic reasons (repression, crises or, vice versa, democratization and boom). This exodus will be very unfavorable for the country in terms of structure since the most active people will leave (attracted by “spring” or “summer” countries) as well as the most educated (they will be attracted by “summer” and “autumn” countries). During the first half of the century this process of the “de-russification of Russia” (what a horrible label!) will just be beginning, but during the latter half of the twenty-first century it will become a main factor of the country’s decline. The influx of Chinese, Indians and Arabs will increase. Many major Russian cities will become primarily Chinese-Indian or Indian-Chinese-Arab, and the overall share of the Russian population at the end of the twenty-first century will drop by 60%. During the first half of the twenty-second century this process will play itself out, the number of Russians will go down to 55-50% and the economic stranglehold of foreigners (now already “foreigners” since these will mainly be children and grandchildren of twenty-first century migrants) will take on a form of economic and political dominance accompanied by numerous conflicts among one another, among old and new migrants, between the Chinese and the Indians and, of course, between the Russians and the “foreigners.” But this new form of “yoke” will be accepted by Russia more or less calmly. First of all, it will be seen as something unavoidable and a punishment for “sins.” Secondly, it will be seen as essential new blood, acrid like wine; the blood of “spring” and “summer” cultures. Precisely at this time we will see the russification of the mass of migrants coming to Russia between 2008 and 2100, and there will be a strong bloc of Russians and “older migrants.” During the second half of the twenty-second century Russia may become a fractionary country and may even completely lose her independence, but despite the political situation, there will be a “miracle of the Christianization” of Russia and the “miracle” of the return of Russian migrants who moved to the West between 2008 and 2100. In any case, between 2050 and 2200 a new Russian ethnos will be formed and will include a generous admixture of Chinese and Indian blood. It is possible that during the ensuing period the main conflict will be one between individualistic “Western Russians” and community-oriented “Eastern Russians,” but since the new national idea will be created (through suffering!) by the “Eastern” Russians, their “Western” counterparts, despite their wealth and influence in Europe and America, will be forced to accept the new values or return to the West (remain in Europe or America).

Out of the “long winter” of 2005-2197 Russia will emerge renewed and ready for a new start in the four-hundred-year race for influence and domination in Eurasia.

Now let’s try to answer the question of the essence and meaning of Russian history from the very start.

In the seventh and eighth centuries the medieval Russian people formed under various influences, including the peoples of Northern Europe, the Slavic brothers, Byzantium and the Khazars (the first “long spring”). The Russian state was born in the 9th and 10th centuries, and it turned out to be one of the strongest states in Eastern Europe. In the 11th and 12th centuries Russia “got tired,” but having adopted Christianity, Russia took the cultural baton from Byzantium, i.e. took upon herself the weighty mission of conciliation and synthesis of the Western and Eastern cultural codes and cultural traditions; after all, the Orthodox type of Christianity which formally recognized the tri-unity of God (the Trinity of God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Spirit) gave full and unconditional authority solely to God the Father, maintaining that the light of truth, i.e. the Holy Spirit, comes only from God the Father. Catholicism “allowed” the Son vadiated the Holy Spirit. This is the main difference between the dogmas and basic cultural codes! Catholic (Western) culture  in this recognized the equality of authority of God the Father (collective elements) and God the Son (individual elements), and Orthodoxy only the unconditional authority of God the Father. This means that Orthodoxy occupies an interim position between the one-god Islam and the practically dualist Catholicism (the Spirit is not independent, it comes from the Father and the Son). Only the community (in religion, the church congregation), only the “collective unconscious” is the main moral authority for the Orthodox, and Jesus Christ, from the point of view of logic, is something more like God’s chief prophet, a kind of Mohammed, and not God. But dogma and ritual aside, in this the Orthodox are closer to Catholicism than to the Moslem faith. Orthodoxy, like all of Christianity, is divided and contradictory, and this is the division between the authority of the community and the authority of the individual conscience. In this duality we can find the source of internal conflicts and suffering, but it is also a source of development. Islam, since it has only one authority figure, is cyclical; it constantly returns to God and to the foundations of the communal understanding of life. This return is always like the return of the “prodigal son” to the father, i.e. the return through negation of the self, one’s right to personal opinion on social questions.

Western Christianity is also cyclical: it either returns to God the Father or, straying from him, approaches God the Son, i.e. it periodically changes its point of reference and is not only repentant, but in negation and hence in the dynamics, in movement. We can say that all of European culture is built on this “gap” between the Father and the Son since returning to God the Father, westerners don’t always destroy the fruits of their individual conscience sanctified by the authority of Christ.

Orthodox Christianity, never straying from God the Father for long, sees Christ more as its “representative,” “consoler” and “lobbyist,” a kind of intercessor before God the Father. In contrast to the Catholic, for the Orthodox believer Christ is not the king, he is not the “chief,” but a “gray cardinal,” a “personnel assistant” or the “manager” who can be approached without confronting the stern and inaccessible God the Father. So Orthodox believers, and Russian Orthodox in particular, are always a little coy before God and do create a culture in which they can at one and the same time be with God and cheat on him, be saintly and sinful at the same time. After all, in Orthodox Russia, in contrast to the Catholic and then the Protestant-Catholic West, religion is not a source of societal development and the “Messianic,” i.e. a desire to impose one’s own values on other cultures. It is a source of adaptation to almost any form of material life and to any situation, from complete slavery to the nation’s own empire. In Islam religion is a source of permanent “counter evolution.” Perhaps since it has been swept by all the winds, the Great Russian plains have become the main reason for such a choice: to fight or to adapt. This is one of the main Russian values: not creative changing of the world as in Catholicism, not eternal repentance and “return to sources” as in Islam, but eternal adaptation to the situation, to other peoples, patience, but patience with a share of the special cunning and readiness to “send everything to the devil.” The manifestations of this can be found in adaptation to the cruel yoke (the Church was friendly with the khans), in the adaptation of Russia's imperial idea to the idea of world revolution, and that the Russian’s found god in the very system of “atheistic communism.”

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Russia saw a “long winter” that did not allow her to throw off the yoke or assimilate the conquerors as opposed, for example, to China. It was at this time that the Russian nation actually took shape, a nation known for its patience and ability to adapt in social life, but whose state is known for despotism and cruelty. The Russians’ image of the state, of their state is a “direct copy” of the cruel system of foreign oppression and, finally, the tolerance of Russians in relationships between peoples and communities does not hinder hopeless competition and anarchy in individual behavior, sanctified from time to time by a winking Christ who seems to say “come on, here’s your chance, have some fun; I’m up here in heaven to console you.” It was from these values of “patience,” “freedom” and the “strict ruler” that modern Russian culture arose. Since these values turned out to contradict each other radically, the history of Russia developed by trying to resolve these contradictions, the most important of which being the contradiction between the anarchic spirit of the Russian people (freedom and will) and the super-despotic state, with that very same “strict” ruler, the symbol for which was the bloody but at least “familiar” Ivan the Terrible who seems to be the only tsar to be the hero of multiple folk songs. Apart, these elements could bring grief, but together, in combination and limiting each other, they made the country stronger. When the “anarchic” element was in dominance, strife would come about… or “senseless and relentless” insurrection. When the second element was in dominance, a “great silence” would arise in the wake of the horrors of the rules of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin.

During the latter half of the “long winter” the ideas of Sergii of Radonezh first inspired the people to victory at the Battle of Kulikovo Field, then led to the formulation of the new Russian spirit; they became values around which the people could rally and create a great state and a great culture.

However, quite possibly (and most likely), the process of the formation of the national spirit is not individual and not even simply a collective process. More likely, a special “quantum” condition arises within the people. The “collective unconscious” steps in and makes the discovery, and the wise men are left to call attention to and interpret this discovery. They make their conclusions on a lower, i.e. symbolic level. Thus, most likely, it was not Sergii of Radonezh who discovered the national idea. He only contributed his example to inspiring people, just as it wasn’t Confucius who revealed to the Chinese their national idea. He only translated this idea into norms and rules of behavior. This is really a separate topic, the theme of the “collective unconscious” and the “collective super-consciousness.” These are not allegories, but real collective personalities that are no less real than our and your “I.” These individuals are incomparably more genial than the personality of any human genius.

Between 1429 and 1621 Russia asserted herself as a strong Asian power that took interest in the West, in Europe. At that time she had already thrown off the Mongol yoke, created a powerful Muscovy and had undertaken and completed the “accumulation of the Russian lands,” survived the horridly despotic rule of Ivan the Terrible, the destructive rule of Boris Godunov, the Time of Troubles and the Polish intervention, and had ensured the restoration of the state under an elected tsar. This was a time of the inner casting off of the yoke (it was no coincidence that Ivan the Terrible so feared a new Mongol yoke). Almost 100 years after the end of the Mongol yoke the old fears still remained in the blood of the Russian people. But during the Time of Troubles new fears and dangers pushed out the old. New fears of the threat from the West, the experience of political disturbance during which the people were subjected not to the Mongol-Tatar influence, but to the influence of the anarchic Russian spirit itself, the spirit of the Cossack settlements similar to the spirit of the Mongol cavalry when the Russians “discovered the Tatar in themselves,” when they sensed not only the ability to endure slavery and humiliation, but also complete freedom, to the subjugation of others; that’s when the Russian spirit temporarily made peace with itself. Now the horrible reign of Ivan the Terrible didn’t seem so horrid. The “rule” of the Time of Troubles turned out to be even worse, if only because it managed to erase the bad aspects of the reign of Ivan the Terrible and romanticize it. Unlimited despotic rule and the freedom of the people left without authority became two extremes of the manifestation of the Russian spirit which subsequently were faced with either uniting into a single whole or acting separately.

Between 1621 and 1813 the two elements were joined, i.e. despotic rule was limited by the despotism of the people and the freedom of the people (do what you will!) was limited by the freedom of the ruler. For this reason, the period between 1621 and 1669 really was a “golden half-century” of mutual conciliation. But already at that time Orthodox Russian culture, internally static and at the same time sensitive to external tensions and dissonance, caught the obvious contradiction between the increasingly wealthy West and the economically stagnant Russia. So during the period of the “medium autumn” (1669-1717) Russia started to attempt to catch up with the West, began to adapt herself to one of the Western models (the German-Dutch model), which unavoidably disrupted the equilibrium between the authorities and the people. During the “medium winter of the long summer” (1717-1765) Russia almost unexpectedly and unnoticed fell under complete political control of the Germans; it was precisely during this period that what would later be a tragic contradiction between the Germanized elite and the “God-bearing people” would arise. Finally, between 1765 and 1813 the reverse process was set into motion during which the Germans living in Russia became russified and the elite became not German, but Russo-German with a noticeable gravitation toward Germany’s European antipode, France (the French language, revolutionary and Voltairean ideas, the Decembrist movement and anti-German policies). During this period (the “long summer”), Russia became an Empire, one of the main European powers, and a power dominating its neighboring Asian countries (Turkey, Iran, the countries of Central Asia), and “pushed” China back to her current borders. The equilibrium that had been found between the mutual savagery of the authorities and that of  popular behavior was disrupted by the newcomers, by the Germans who, although they attempted to modernize Russia, created a new contradiction. In place of the Mongol or Mongol-Russian elite, now we had a German-Russian elite, then a Russian-German elite that was even further from the Orthodox people than the Mongol elite, and from a people that was also internally fragmented into free Cossacks and peasant serfs. This wasn’t so much a split as a hierarchy. The strongest of the serfs ran away to the Cossacks, thus facilitating the preservation of slavery within Russia, but at the same time creating an outpost of Russian culture to expand to the East or South of the continent.

Between 1813 and 1861 (the “medium summer”) the authorities and the people hit upon the formula for reconciliation: fatherland (folk), Orthodoxy, absolutism. This wasn’t an artificial formula like the products of the current strained search for national symbols and a national idea (like the “plucked” eagle stripped of its crown). These were mutated and “acculturized” basic values of adaptation (patience), freedom and the strong ruler. The Europeanized elite made a point of adopting popular tendencies. Pushkin hallowed the Russian idea with his poetic discoveries. Russia again dozed off, pacified by her role of European policeman, considering her chief mission to subdue the lands to the East and South. The Germans began to adapt their names to the Russian manner and really did turn out to be good Russian patriots. A great literature grew during this period, thriving on popular subjects. But the Crimean War “unexpectedly” jolted Russia out of her slumber and again bared the nation’s weak spot: the economy. The Russian elite recognized that Russia would not get by without new attempts at modernization, without further europeanization since the Empire, Great Russia was already on the map, not to mention the state of national pride, which by that time had become customary and natural.

Between 1861 and 1909 all the necessary economic, social and some political reform was carried out. The Russian peasant community ceased to be the foundation of popular life. Industrial cities began to spring up. The reforms were difficult but successful. Russia quickly caught up to Europe in terms of economic development. But for the first time in the history of Russia these reforms “challenged” God and the foundations of the communal daily life of the peasantry which soon became free (read: unmanageable). The foundations of the paternalistic system were broken up, the fundamental and main balance in culture, i.e. the balance between the anarchy (despotism) of the people and the despotism (anarchy) of the authorities had been lost. The authorities became more liberal, but the people, having noticed the lack of the customary restraint from above, began to dabble in revolution, and took liberation as complete freedom, especially since during the 19th century the Cossacks had crystallized as a distinct people and it became harder for average peasants to join the Cossacks, especially since there were now no “wild” (i.e. unoccupied) frontiers. The entire “wild” world of Eurasia had been divided between Russia and England. So far, only frequent and successful wars saved Russia from the people unleashing their fury, but the war with Japan was a complete fiasco of the unstable system that relied on a compromise between liberal authorities and the people who fought for the Empire. The first Russian revolution, in many ways “senseless and unrelenting” like all Russian revolts, passed. The revolution made the authorities even more liberal and the people even more militant. The First World War, despite miracles of bravery and military skill shown by the Russian soldiers and generals, ended not in victory, and not even in defeat, but in revolution since the contradiction between the authorities, which were no longer just liberal but blatantly stupid and weak, and the now completely free people had become too unbearable. The people were more accustomed to arms and war than to the plough and peacetime. But this was already another age.

In contrast to westerners, who possess a pragmatic, transformable freedom of conscience, the freedom to choose between God the Father (the communal) and Christ (personal conscience raised on the Gospels), Russians had only inner freedom, receding from the world, the same freedom between God the Father and Christ, but a Christ mainly intended to absolve sins and represent the sinner in heaven. So westerners couldn’t help but transform the world if for some reason they weren’t satisfied with it or if it did not correspond to their convictions, but Russians just “banished” this world from sight during moments of unbearable contradiction between existence and consciousness (“neither the church nor the tavern are holy!”), and were beholden to no one at that time, neither to God nor to other men. That’s probably why Russians like themselves. Imagine that your inner freedom disappears, giving way to a single and indivisible God. In this case the Russian spirit disappears and the Russian becomes a Moslem. In contrast to the “Western Christ,” the “Russian Christ” is not a higher, clearly fixed moral authority, but a roving authority. This is where the difference between the Russian and the Westerner lies. But allow us to explain further. Speaking of Christ’s roving I don’t mean Christ as a God of the living, the Christ of the saints or the Christ of deeply religious people. They see Christ the son of God the Father, i.e. as he is. I’m speaking of Christ as a moral authority for the mass consciousness; that’s where he “roves.”

Between 1909 and 1957 the economic race to catch up with the West, remaining an external priority forced on the country from without, actually made way for the idea of a new empire that was updated in the form of a world revolution. It was as if Russia were trying to “show up” the West with its economic successes and alien liberalism by creating a mobilization economy and a totalitarian political system. A rapid change of paradigms took place from the weakening state and increasingly anarchic people of 1861-1909 to a people stripped of its right and a completely sovereign state independent of its people, yet a “popular” state that had disposed of the alien Russian-German elite; to a state in which the people’s anarchism was expressed in the right to self-oppression and self-terror. Actually, it would be impossible to think up a more reprehensible and witty system. During collectivization people participated in expropriating the property of their relatives and their very selves! People were at the same time oppressors (as agents of the state) and oppressed (as individuals with personal property). Then the endless string of purges in which the expropriators and the expropriated, the executioner and the victims changed places at breathtaking speeds: today you’re the executioner and tomorrow the victim. The day after tomorrow your executioner will become the victim. A temporary “god” had been found, a “god” who had cast off his personal conscience and family traditions (Pavlik Morozov as a national hero). Orthodoxy, having turned into communism, set not just the task of creating a new empire, but a more global task of destroying the despised foundations for the economic competition with the West that was so destructive for Russia. Economics became the object of attention, and a socialist economy that would become communist and spread throughout the world would simply cease to develop. In this case Russia would have made herself domestically secure and would have returned to the balance of the anarchic and despotic wills of the state and the people. And the people, by the way, understood this deep down, and so they supported the regime thinking “we’ll tighten our belts, throw off the bourgeois yoke, then live well, merrily and happily, partying to no end, working a bit here and there without those extra Western conveniences.” And frankly, what could be more important than basic values such as water, air, trees, sun, women and children? But Bolshevik communism wasn’t Orthodoxy, but a parody of Orthodoxy. It didn’t have any life-giving force, it wasn’t a science-like schema that would have mobilized a sense of negation, negative emotions and human qualities like envy (“sense of social justice”), hate (“sacred hatred”!) and suspicion (“watchfulness”!).

It became clear that there wouldn’t be any move west since the West not only had its own atomic bomb, but was stronger than the Soviet Union according to all accounts, having created a strongly anti-Soviet military and political bloc. After the first attempt to create a socialist commonwealth that showed the countries of Eastern Europe to have “remained in the West” and that Russian domination was impossible here without military might; after China for all intents and purposes broke off from the Soviet Union, the elite began to recognize the fact that there would be no international revolution, not to mention a world-wide Russian empire, at least in the near future… and in the distant future as well, and that it would be necessary to live in peace with the West and worry more about maintaining conquered territories than expansion. But there was another discovery even more important than this. Along with the scientific and technological revolution that was quickly changing all aspects of daily life not only of the elite, but also of the average people, came the gradual understanding that there would be no end to economic development even if the world revolution were to succeed, that an unsavory economic race lay ahead and, consequently, the formula for equilibrium in Russia, i.e. “despotism against anarchy,” was exhausted under the new historical conditions. Russia was faced with rejoining the path of development followed by European civilization in which a liberal state relies on economically and spiritually free citizens.

That was the start of the period 1957-2005. But while liberal ideas quietly matured in peoples’ minds, the process of weakening the will of the state and increasing the people’s will was already a physical reality. During the period of the Thaw and the so-called “men of the sixties,” things began to even out. But the essence of this historical period was not normalization of Russian life, only a temporary stabilization prior to the re-birth of the entire social, political and economic system. That is why between 1969 and 1981 the state with its bankrupted historical mission became a “colossus on clay feet” and the anarchic element received an excellent “sphere of activity” for total corruption in state-appropriated property. Everyone stole, from the lowly card-carrying communist to the members of the Central Committee. Stealing became the norm, if not universally approved, then at least not condemned by society or this society’s elite.

The elements of theft grew during the period 1981-2005 and destroyed the old way of life, themselves becoming a “way of life” (one symbol can be found in the “new Russians”) and the raw materials parasitism of the entire country. What we are currently experiencing is a modern version of the “time of troubles.” Of course there is a key difference between that “spring-summer” and the current “autumn-winter” period. At that time, Russia had gained meaning and a formula for her existence and development, but today she has lost even that formula. Most likely, now Russia will be faced with a drawn-out search for a new formula for existence that will now include immanently economic goals. It is possible that this means that Russia will “sign a union” with Catholicism and practically turn into a second Poland. But more likely Russia will go the Chinese way (we must take into account that Chinese civilization is now embarking on a “long summer,” and the northern European civilization is on the brink of a “long autumn,” but more about this later), making the familial community her essential basis and, perhaps, will discover Japanese formulae such as “the state as a community” and “the company as a community.”

Two hundred years from now, Russians will most likely be a profoundly Orthodox people, their external appearance will be basically the same as it is today, but there will be more Chinese and Indian faces in the crowd. Their God will bless the company they work for and will soon come to resemble more the ascetic and boringly businesslike Protestant God of prayer rooms at factories than the God of Orthodox churches, who will already have become something exotic. God the Father will descend from the state heavens to become more intimate with believers, to become “familial and corporate.”

Since God the Father will cease to be a “big boss,” then the need for the intercession of God the Son will also decrease. Christ will lose his status as “our man up there” since it will become harder to “commit a sin” before the company or the close-knit familial (clan) community than before a distant state. But there will be no “moslemization” of Russian life and the Russian spirit since God himself will “descend from the heavens to earth” and will become the father of a specific community. It is more likely that God and life will come under Chinese influence. The adaptability of the Russians, their ability to live and still be themselves will be preserved and practiced under the most difficult conditions, to survive and develop further in 2050-2200 when their state will become a kind of sieve allowing other peoples to enter the Russian territory. The economy will be controlled by the Chinese, Europeans, Indians and Americans. At the end of the twenty-second century Russians will be a minority in the major cities of European Russia. Russians will also be in the minority in the middle and senior levels of the state and municipal governments since, considered in their entirety, there will be more Tatars, Ukrainians, Indians, Jews, Chinese and Germans in the organs of state power than Russians, but Russians will continue to unnoticeably dominate spiritual and social life by uniting around them all these “newcomers.” But between 2200 and 2400 the Russians will again create a strong state and will take economic and political control back into their own hands if, of course, the nation state still exists in the world at that time.

But may there not also be an emasculation of the Russian spirit whose place lies between God, i.e. in the political sense between the strong state (Church hierarchy) and “our man” Christ who “suffered and bid others to suffer” but occasionally winks at us, and we may even see in his squint (perhaps in Lenin’s squint) the rakish grin of the devil? Christ will probably find a new place in this system, he won’t let the Russians become completely Japanese or Chinese. The Russians will never be completely dedicated to their companies, just as they have never been fully faithful to the Russian Church, state or party. Russians will always be ready to curse influences they don’t like and will always be anarchic and ready to betray any idols or authorities, and for this reason will continue to be enigmatic and impossible to peg down in this new branch of history. This is the principle archetype of the Russian national character and the Russian spirit. Ivan the Fool (or Emelya) can lay around on the brick stove all his life, or he can slay a dragon. It’s just as easy for him to live in poverty as in a palace. And this means that the Russians will be different everywhere, in some places more individualistic, in others more accustomed to the Chinese-influenced family system, and in others to the Japanese corporate style. They will be different everywhere depending on their location and neighbors, judging by external conditions, but they will everywhere sense their spiritual and psychological unity, their internal unity of free people. And anyone who “awakens” or “gets to” the Russians won’t have a good time of it (it’s too bad the Chechens forgot about this). But what does this mean other than just cursing? This means that even in the new “long cycle” of their history Russians will not generate any positive ideas to reconstruct the world, and like a sponge will absorb and assimilate foreign ideas, but even having absorbed them, will remain free from their absolutization; Russians will not initiate any mass Crusades, groups of religious fanatics or missionaries. No, they will absorb new ideas but will contain them in the space of their spirit between the severe God and the lenient (between God and devil) Christ, and from time to time they will kick out idols they have gotten sick of like old rubbish, just as early in this century they threw off Orthodoxy itself by destroying churches, and at the end of the twentieth century rejected communism. In 2008-2200 Russian culture will accept and adapt Western and Eastern values, and after 2200 will go the direction of the strongest influence. Most likely this will be a Chinese-Indian influence. In other words, the europeanization of Russia during the first half of the twenty-first century will be exchanged for Chinese and Indian influences since China will be entering into a major phase of growth, and Northern Europe will begin to fall. But actually these probabilities are not very different. So this is where the future scene of battle between giants will take place. It is unclear who will win. We should also remember that the America is still experiencing a “summer” and that Southern Europe is just entering into a “summer” period.

VII. History and Future of Germany

Let’s unite the “long” and “medium cycles” in our analysis:

 

1525

  Long spring

1717

1525

summer

1573

Autumn

1621

winter

1669

spring

1717

 

1717

  Long summer

1909

1717

summer

1765

autumn

1813

winter

1861

spring

1909

 

1909

  Long autumn

2101

1909

summer

1957

autumn

2005

winter

2053

spring

2101

 

The “long spring” of 1525-1717 began with the Reformation, with Martin Luther, when the German people began to leave Catholicism and to abandon God the Father as the only and irreproachable authority, to adopt Christ as an authority equal to God the Father. Luxury, whose purpose is to immerse believers in the “collective unconscious,” is banned from the churches. Churches become ascetic and come to resemble a confessional. Now it’s not everyone together, but each man for himself, personally appealing to God, i.e. religion becomes individualized as a result of the individualization of economic life prepared for by the preceding development of Europe during the late feudal era.

Truthfully speaking, the “medium autumn of the long spring” (1573-1621) in Germany is something of a “white spot” for me, but the ensuing period (1621-1669) became the setting for the terrifying Thirty Years' War after which Germany became a country divided and stripped of influence in Europe. In 1669-1717 the “spring-spring” Germans, despite their continuing division, practically colonized Russia, at first having won the heart and mind of Tsar Peter.

What was the meaning of this long period? The “spring period” in Russia was a period of complete political freedom from the yoke and creation of a new Russian nation, as an heir not only of the ancient Russian, but also the Mongol spirit, and a new formula came about: “barbaric sovereignty as a limitation to the anarchic people,” then Germany saw a revolution of rationalism. But in exchange, Germany lost her place in Europe and also got lost politically. However, she did continue to develop, which is very important, even in a state of division (this, by the way, shows the difference between “spring” and “winter” division, i.e. the essence of the “spring” is development of inner strength broadly throughout society, gathering strength, and the essence of the “winter” period is degradation of the masses, but also new solutions evolving in the minds of the small spiritual elite). During this time Austria, being a part of German culture (it’s not so important in this case that Austria continued to be a Catholic country), fought a war with Turkey and finally won, thus defending Europe on this front during the period 1669-1717. In the ensuing period, rationalism, individualism and the economic orientation of the “new formula” of the German nation—as opposed to the former “crusading-conquering” formula—would make her expansion extremely powerful (without forgetting the Crusaders).

In 1717-1765 Prussia was on the rise. Austria was at the zenith of her power. The Germans practically ruled Russia. The Austrian Empire fought with France for hegemony in Europe.

Between 1765 and 1813 Europe and Germany were swept with revolutionary movements and wars, Prussia grew weak, and Austria managed to preserve herself, but ceased developing. Already at this time it became obvious that she couldn’t handle a big empire.

1813-1861 was a period of frost. Germany experienced a slump and internal disintegration, but Prussia was becoming ripe and taking on the role of a unifier for Germany which, having experienced the revolution of 1848, was accumulating a powerful intellectual potential (“winter” is the best time for the growth of intellect if this “winter” is relatively calm), Austria attempted to hold her empire at all costs, but couldn’t do this without help from Russia and Prussia.

Between 1861 and 1909 Germany united and defeated France (1870), then gained European hegemony and tried out the role of leading European state. Austria used all means possible to retain her empire, but was forced to split power with the Hungarians and the Czechs.

What did this long period, the “long summer” of 1717-1909, mean for the history of Germany? The Germans found a system of values that could be united in one formula as economic strategies are united by a mission: the state must be strong in order to protect those who produce material wealth, and producers must work to see that the state becomes wealthier and stronger. The state, in turn, protecting the producers, has the right to engage in preventive aggression in order to make the entire world German. If in Russia the main goal of imperial aggression was to halt the economic development disrupting the balance of powers in Russian society, then in Germany it was the other away around: the state had to make things safe for the “drones.” Quite possibly this is the key to the irreconcilable difference between the two cultures.

The “medium summer of the long autumn” (1909-1957) is a period of greatest concentration of the German spirit on fulfilling goals set during the preceding 400 years. In Russia the “medium summer of the long autumn” (1813-1861) is a period of harmony between the state and the people. The creative Russian mission is directed toward reconciling the cultures of the West and the East and only in an unhealthy and distorted form takes on an aggressive nature (the idea of the “world conflagration” and stopping economic development is not a healthy, but a compensatory and unhealthy idea). The foreign mission of Germany aimed at instituting order to ensure economic development is another thing. So the German spirit, as opposed to the Russian spirit, is immanently imperialistic and aggressive. Russia reconciles, but secretly dreams of leveling everyone. Germany conquers without clearly understanding why other peoples resist. From this comes the “craftiness” and “jadedness” of Russians so terrifying to Westerners, and vice versa, the German “self-righteousness” and “pig-headedness” that so annoy other peoples.

So, having concentrated on world expansion, Germany started two world wars and undertook two titanic attempts to re-make the world according to her plans. Having been defeated in the first war, Germany recovered quickly and dealt the world another, stronger blow. The most interesting part is that after the first knockdown, Germany got back up again and within 10-15 years was already seeking the role of a great economic power.

The period of “autumn of autumn” (1957-2005) is a period of the formation of a new German model of the social and economic organization of society, of the social market economy. Germany has once again become a great European power with economic dominance on the continent. But apparently Germany is facing local disintegration in 2005-2053 (“winter-autumn”).

What could cause the decrease of German activity and her influence in Europe and the world? The overtly social nature of her economics? Or perhaps the fact that, no matter how strange it seems, the Germans have too many holidays these days (too much rest)? Or that even limited European integration can disintegrate Germany, make the vectors of development of different parts of Germany diverge? Perhaps the Germans are giving up too much to create a united Europe? To a certain extent they see this unification as a “clever” substitute for the idea of the German empire since they hope, based on past experience, to take over all the command positions with time. They have already backed down from the strong German Mark, and quite possibly may give up some of their key achievements. But apparently the greatest “hardship” awaiting the Germans in the next half-century is the relative decrease in need for individual craftsmanship and mastery, a new victory of the conveyor and very narrow specialization in not very intellectually demanding functions, globalization of practically all markets and the gradual exclusion of humans by computers. The German economy is strong because of its individualism and trademark know-how, medium and small business and manufacture of small batches of products, especially those of high quality. None can match them in this on the continent, and on a world scale only Japan comes close, but the Germans dominate in hundreds of industries that are gathered into powerful clusters, whereas the Japanese can count only dozens. It is possible that all of the above factors will bring Germany to a “strange” fall, a relative decline that will nevertheless be very painful for German pride and German plans. So in place of domination in Europe, Germany will dissolve economically and serious tensions and conflicts will arise in her social life. It is possible that this will mean the end of European unification, or Europe could face a new division between East and West, but the West will be Italian-Spanish-French, and the East could become German-Russian. Another issue is that in the upcoming decades Southern European countries could be on the rise, including Italy and Spain. They could see a growth in influence and significance, all the way to domination in Europe in the twenty-second and twenty-third centuries.

Let’s analyze the medium cycles of German history in the twentieth century in more detail:

 

1909

 Medium summer

1957

1909

summer

1921

autumn

1933

winter

1945

spring

1957

 

1957

  Medium autumn

2005

1957

summer

1969

autumn

1981

winter

1993

spring

2005

 

In 1909-1921 German militarism evolved completely during the pre-war and war years, but even after the war and the revolutionary storm there was no repentance. On the contrary, corrections were made, they decided to “go another route,” but in the same direction. The imperial spirit was already prepared to temporarily sacrifice the spirit of individualistic economic initiative and in 1921-1933 found its appropriate embodiment in national socialism which, amazingly enough, was only outwardly similar to the Stalinism then developing in Russia. Every man has his own mental illness. The Russians decided that with their help the first world revolution would become “senseless and merciless” and the Germans, as always more open and direct (crude), proclaimed themselves the chosen nation.

In 1933-1945 national socialism “died” when it attained its full incarnation, having managed to come to power, rebuild and mobilize the country, begin a world war and suffer defeat. In 1945-1957 the Germans repented, having rejected the imperial idea, and began to do that which they always knew how to do best… create their own economic welfare and the wealth of their land. But the Germans never stopped being patriots of their country, and if the state idea turned out to be temporarily compromised by the Nazi empire, by the enormous “rational” state factories of destruction in the form of the concentration camps, then the Germans continued to defend the idea of the unity of their nation by uniting the zones occupied by the Western allies into the Federal Republic of Germany. But that’s not the point, rather the Germans can’t just get rich for themselves since their historical memory reminds them of the instability of the situation in which the people get rich while the state becomes weak. So they created a very powerful federal territory system (i.e. the system of local government) and unified the economy not on the state, or purely bureaucratic, level but on the level of the socio-economic national institutions in which the banks began to play a key role and owners shared power with workers, creditors and suppliers. The so-called “fascist” corporate idea was adapted to the new conditions. German domestic unity was reinstated using a very complex and clever means, avoiding the former simple and clear bureaucratic options. This is a truly great achievement, but will it last?

In conclusion we can say that the period 1909-1957 was a period of development and decline of the German imperial idea in its extremist form, i.e. national socialism which in 1945-1957 was rejected by the Germans not only outwardly but inwardly, and exchanged for the more modest idea of the social market economy. In 1957-1969 the social market economy gathered strength and brought Germany and the Germans new prosperity. In 1969-1981 Germany became an economically dominant power in Europe. In 1981-1993, apparently the country underwent a kind of domestic crisis (I don’t have any information on this), and in 1993-2005 the idea of the German social market economy will be transformed into an idea of European domination, as usually happens in the “spring,” for which Germany will begin to expend her previously gained advantages. In essence this is a new imperial idea revived by new possibilities presented to Germany by the fall of the eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. In this sense Gorbachev dealt Germany a bad hand by “giving” her the German Democratic Republic. Enormous efforts and sums of money were spent on unifying Germany. The unification did come about, but cost 2-3 times more than it would have with a calmer approach to the matter. The cleverness of this "gift" is not in the cost, and not even in the fact that they submitted to the East Germans accustomed to “doing nothing” by presenting them on a silver platter that which they should have earned themselves. Instead of giving them freedom, the West Germans gave them wealth, which was demanded by the system of a social economy. The cleverness lies elsewhere, in the fact that the old imperial idea was reborn. The Germans once again acquired a taste for expansion, and now the idea of European unification has become an obsession for the Germans. But the time wasn’t chosen too wisely. They are now facing a “medium winter” which could cost the Germans much disappointment and loss of momentum, and perhaps even more: stability and their current positions in Europe. In the end, how can you combine the unity of an unevenly developed Europe and high standards, high salaries and lofty social guarantees of the Germans? Only by rejecting the achievements of the social economy since it wouldn’t be possible to quickly improve the overall European standard of living. In exchange for what? For influence, power and stability on the European scale? First of all, a new expansion would meet with resistance from France and Italy, and secondly from the United States and England which would encourage these countries to fight against Germany in her attempt to gain hegemony. The price paid for the unification of Europe under German rule would truly be too great, and they would be the first to suggest leaving the Europe of the Bretton Woods Conference, i.e. the “spring” of the European idea in Germany in 1993-2005 will lead to a “summer” of real unification in 2005-2017 and an “autumn” in 2017-2029 when the contradictions and problems will begin to outweigh the advantages of unification, then the “winter” of 2029-2041 when European unification will split along the Western border of Germany. If in 2005-2029 the process can be halted, then Europe will simply (well, of course not simply) return to her original borders of 1995-2008.

Quite possibly in 2040-2060 ideas of creating a sphere of economic co-prosperity in the East will become popular, i.e. Germany, having become disenchanted with the idea of Atlantis and the European idea, will attempt along with Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Russia to create a zone of eastern co-prosperity in which the Germans will see themselves in the role of the economic ruler, but without social obligations toward the citizens of these countries.

VIII. History and Future of the United States

1513

Long winter

1705

1513

summer

1561

Autumn

1609

winter

1657

spring

1705

 

1705

Long spring

1897

1705

summer

1753

autumn

1801

winter

1849

spring

1897

 

1897

Long summer

2089

1897

summer

1945

autumn

1993

winter

2041

spring

2089

 

In contrast to Russia and Germany, whose history goes back centuries, the history of the United States is contemporary. After all, the American Indian tradition was cut short. So we are immediately confronted with the question of which “season” starts US history? Apparently “winter,” i.e. the initial natural disintegration of the ethnic makeup that has yet to be born. However, this supposition doesn’t work with the countries of Latin America; they’re under a “Spanish cycle.” I don’t have enough information but can say that the formula for the American spirit came about in 1657-1705.

It was between 1705 and 1753 that the national consciousness of the future United States was formed. The inhabitants of the English colony felt themselves to be Americans, different from the English, and this self-consciousness and real unity that came about allowed them to break free from English rule despite the fact that at that time England was just coming to the height of her power. In 1801-1849 the United States got “lost” in world history, having broken into two camps within the country, into the southern and northern factions, slave-owning and capitalist, “aristocratic” and democratic. Finally, America was ripped apart by the Civil War, the war between the North and the South, after which the United States strove to achieve rapid economic power, at the same time becoming a territorially large nation dominating first North America, then the entire continent.

What is the civilizational idea that drives the Americans? We know that there are various forms of Protestantism in this country, i.e. the country is based on the same idea of individual economic freedom as in Germany. But in the United States they don’t have the same reverence for the state as in Germany since America was always strong enough not to fear her neighbors and, more precisely, the neighbors of the United States were always weak enough that the Americans took foreign threat as a part of their world view. This is why the Americans were able to develop the idea of economic individualism further into the idea of complete autonomy of the individual in all spheres of public life. For this reason, electoral democracy took root precisely in the USA, which since then has become the symbol of such a system. Is the American consciousness imperialistic? No, it is not, because empires most often arise not out of “good” but out of “bad,” not from greed, but from the desire to protect oneself and one’s culture from outside interference. All empires without exception are primarily a burden. In all empires without exception there is a “flow of strength” from the ruling nation to the subjugated nations. The Americans don’t have such a paradigm in their consciousness, otherwise they would have established their order throughout the American continent long ago, and all the countries of Latin America would be governed by governor-generals collecting taxes. The United States is not so much an “imperial” as a “hegemonistic” state. It is sufficient for the USA that any country would trade with them on the most “liberal conditions,” i.e. on conditions beneficial to the United States.

What did the “long summer” bring? This “summer” brought America a rich harvest and rapid development in 1897-1945 and further strengthening of this role and influence in 1945-1993. But now another dissonance can be heard: there are “parasitic tendencies” to live and rule through the instrument of a strong currency, to “get into major intrigue” in order to keep one or another country from becoming more powerful, and mass culture has begun to gradually devolve into primitive and intrusive propaganda of the American way of life. The country is currently undergoing a dangerous undermining of communal foundations which, despite the fact that they were placed in the background by Protestantism, make up the basis of culture and the world view of all Western nations. Americans are losing these foundations and becoming a nation of absolutely autonomous individuals and institutions. We see that American lawyers are not just defending the law, but can wrangle millions of dollars with the help of the law for the most senseless offenses that may even have been thought up by the lawyers themselves. This threatens the entrepreneurial spirit on which America is based and which is risky by nature. These are the obvious signs of a “local winter” when the “material” (political, social, economic relations, traditions and views) breaks away from the basic spirit, which is religious in nature, when the “sense of style” and the “sense of measure” are disrupted.

A new heyday is ahead, but it will only come after a painful crisis in 1993-2041, especially 2017-2030. America (the United States) will be rich and beautiful in 2050-2180 and will probably be the wealthiest country in the world during that period. But on the American continent, not to mention Eurasia, her influence will be limited by the powerful start of Latin Europe and Latin America, as well as the force of influence of China. I can't say anything sufficiently complex about India yet since it’s not a mono-culture. Most likely India, just as Europe, has many national spirits, or at least two: the southern and the northern spirits, or the Buddhist and the Hindu spirits. They are currently in different phases of a “long cycle.” Moreover, dualism is also characteristic for China with its south and north, Confucianism and Taoism. Perhaps the reason for China’s not having created “world empires” during her long history lies in this internal tension and mutual negation?

The national idea of the Americans is the idea of dual individualism and dual democracy (“two-in-one”), of economic and political individualism, and the market and state economy. The Americans don’t have Russian and German imperial set-ups. Themselves free, the Americans do not strive to enslave others, especially since the flow of immigrants from around the world has made them “tolerant and noble.” They feel secure without conquering other nations and see themselves as the center of the world, which is certainly important.

The main danger for the Americans in the near future is that of losing God the Father, the communal foundations of life and, as strange as it may sound, the “course of the illness” depends on whether the Americans will be able to maintain their world rule in the next 50 years. If the United States are pushed out by China and Europe, then this will be a painful process but one that will heal the national spirit, help them to figure out not what to do with others, but with themselves. They will find a solution and a path to conciliation with new forces in America herself, primarily with the rapidly growing Latino population in the United States. But if national pride develops in 2008-2050, if America is the same or can even more rigidly dictate her will to Europe than today, if China gets “wrapped up” in her domestic problems and the United States become “pinned” to this country’s goals and interests, then there is trouble ahead: rigidity in domestic policy will increase, the “democracy of equal possibilities” will devolve into a “patrician-plebian republic” like that of the late Roman Empire in which the people demanded only “bread and circuses.”

   Let’s take a look at the “medium cycles” of the past decades:

 

 

1897

  Medium summer

1945

1897

summer

1909

autumn

1921

winter

1933

spring

1945

 

1945

  Medium autumn

1993

1945

summer

1957

autumn

1969

winter

1981

spring

1993

 

1993

  Medium winter

2041

1993

summer

2005

autumn

2017

winter

2029

spring

2041

 

In 1897-1909 the system of unregulated capitalism developed harmoniously and freely in the United States. In 1909-1921 the first evidence of dissonance arose, and 1921-1933 saw the arrival of a great economic crisis that led to the introduction of a system of state control over macroeconomics, strict control of banks and Keynsianism. In 1933-1945 Roosevelt’s New Deal brought results. America became stronger, preserving her market economy, democracy and dynamics of development. Free trade and democracy created a modern economy with a state serving the Great Market Economy.

In 1945-1957 the United States gained world hegemony and this increased the role of the state. During these years America was successful in everything and the country gained regular status as the leader of the capitalist world. In 1957-1969 problems arose, the Vietnam War sparked the rise of anti-American sentiment, but the America was at the peak of her popularity as a powerful spiritual force (rock music, the youth movement, the entire lifestyle from President Kennedy to the hippies). In 1969-1981 the country underwent another economic crisis, inflation, gas shortages, a powerful wave of anti-Americanism (for example, in Iran), and a certain loss of popularity of the American economic model (the Japanese sun began to rise in the East). But in 1981-1993 the United States again “broke ahead,” leading in information technologies and financial infrastructure, laying the foundations for a global economy, decentralizing management in large and medium-sized companies and “letting the market” inside companies.

What is the essence of this period (1945-1993), a period of “autumn of the long summer”? In that America has fully taken on her new role as a world leader without having lost the market, but rather strengthening it (there was a temptation to introduce trade barriers at the height of the Japanese trade “aggression”) and democracy (Watergate alone is quite demonstrative). In essence, the “money barons” showed the authorities that they only exist to serve the Market Economy.           

The period 1993-2005 saw the start of the “summer frost,” but this is only noticeable in the nuances. The “American miracle” continues.

Apparently, already in 2005-2017 America will face a formidable challenge to her authority as a universal economic and political model. The danger of a hard “short autumn” will be intensified by the overall unfavorable period (“medium winter of a long autumn”). In 2017-2029 the United States may fall into a whirlwind of crises: in her relations with Europe and China, and in her relations with minorities (a new African American revolution?). It may be even worse with both an African and a Latin American revolution. A difficult economic crisis lies ahead. The Latino elements of the population will revive the specter of the confrontation between South and North, and Latin America will for the first time pose the question of limiting the absolute hegemony of the United States on the American continent. This difficult economic crisis will be intensified by over-specialization and a high level of disconnectedness of economic individuals, which will raise the question of whether the former development that took place in 1980-2020 was a dead end or a trap. But the advent of a new pretender to world hegemony on the horizon, i.e. China in 2010-2030, will force America to make some decisions. Otherwise, the United States will try to export her domestic problems under cover of demonstrative foreign activity. The essence of this period lies in the fact that the “idea of dual freedom” will peter out and cease to adapt to the world, and will try to make the world adapt to it. The danger of this period is that the United States, having sufficient power and influence in the world, may be seduced into using this influence to introduce a new concept of the “atomized producer” everywhere. If  America attempts to use force and influence to impose this dead formula on others, then she will waste a lot of effort and in the end will lose her hegemony by the year 2050. But this would be better for the strategic interests of the United States in order to achieve a new heyday in 2050-2180.

IX. History and Future of France

1429

   Long spring

1621

1429

summer

1477

autumn

1525

winter

1573

spring

1621

 

1621

   Long summer

1813

1621

summer

1669

autumn

1717

winter

1765

spring

1813

 

1813

   Long autumn

2005

1813

summer

1861

autumn

1909

winter

1957

spring

2005

 

2005

   Long winter

2197

2005

summer

2053

autumn

2101

winter

2149

spring

2197

 

France “bears” the Catholic idea in which, as we have already mentioned, there are two authorities: God the Father and God the Son, both of which contain the Holy Spirit, i.e. ultimate truth. Why didn’t the French embrace the Reformation like the Germans? Perhaps because their borders are naturally better protected? Surrounded by the sea on two sides and mountains on another, while Germany lies inland and can be “swept by all the winds” or, more likely (at least this more logically fits the logic of my scheme) because by the time of the Reformation France had already made her choice. Apparently this happened as it usually does during the period of a “medium spring of a long winter,” i.e. in 1381-1429. This was the most difficult period of the Hundred Years’ War. The consequences of the Great Plague were still fresh in peoples’ minds. This was the time of the popes of Avignon. Joan of Arc was burned at the stake in 1430. The new French spirit appeared precisely at this exciting time. What form did it take? The Catholic belief endured all kinds of trials but since France already had enormous influence over the papal hierarchy and during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries many popes were French, France did not reject the papacy as Germany would one hundred years down the line; she just tried to make the Pope French. This failed to happen, but the French did become the most influential nation in the Catholic world, and the appearance of many universities at this time made France susceptible to the ideas of the Italian Renaissance. Catholicism, dark and militant, almost monotheistic, differed little from Orthodoxy in the 11th and 12th centuries (perhaps because at that time there were attempts to unite the Catholic and Orthodox churches), at last clearly recognized the second moral absolute in the person of Christ and now appealed both to the communal God and to the individual God. One hundred years down the road, the Reformation would move further, primarily in terms of ritual, and would subjugate the communal God to the individual God. This would be accomplished by Germany, but France created a unique equilibrium of these two ideals and authorities.

The French did not become “economic individuals” as did the Protestant nations. No, they became something more like “political individuals,” a “festive nation,” a gambling nation, or a nation that in the community hid from individual obligations, and in personal freedoms put the state in its “place,” not to mention religion or other such institutions when they attempt to tame the individual. The French in some ways resemble the Russians, but the Russian idea was formulated during the subservient years of the Mongol yoke, and the French idea arose during the difficult but free and gorgeous years of the Avignon papacy, universal disorder and popular revolt. The Russians hide from the stern God the Father behind Christ, but the French freely communicate with both one and the other as a philandering husband goes from wife to mistress and from mistress to wife. Moreover, the French need a strong state only to protect themselves from outside enemies. The French don’t work as hard as the Germans, but they are better at orienting themselves in uncertain situations and strive not only to celebrate holidays, but to arrange collective festivities, as for example during the first years of the French Revolution or the Napoleonic era.

Now let us trace the evolution of the French national spirit during the period of the “long spring” of 1429-1621. The years 1429-1477 saw the rise of a strong and unified French state that pushed out the English. A few years later Burgundy, the bastion of separatism, became a part of France, and the feudal aristocracy became nothing but servants to the king. In 1477-1525 the so-called Burgundy question was finally solved. France entered into an alliance with Italy (the Pope) against Germany and Spain, and the king managed to increase his power over the Church. In 1525-1573 France, having met with a rapid increase of influence and activity from Spain, concluded an alliance with Germany. This was the reign of Henri of Navarre, the time of religious wars. The period marked by the infamous slaughter of St. Bartholomew’s Night ended in August of 1572. Finally, in 1573-1621 royal power and France herself were so strong that the country became the unattested ruler of the European continent.

Conclusions: during the “spring” period of 1429-1621 the French state became unified and strong, the strongest in Europe, and the French spirit became free and flexible, even “unfaithful.” The French learned to deftly switch from freedom to despotism, from revolution to reaction, from labor to feast. It was Rabelais who best described the “carnival,” “festive,” “light” and “cynical” French spirit of the day.

In 1621 a “long summer period” began. The years 1621-1669 marked the time of the Three Musketeers and although this was an “autumn” tale by the French writer, he managed to convey the spirit of the time quite accurately. There was a strong and growing state with spiritually free, adventurous heroes who in the name of the unfaithful wife of the king would accomplish feats of daring. In essence, this was the same Rabelaisian carnival spirit. The years 1669-1717 marked the most important years of the reign of Louis XIV (the Sun King) and this also says a lot. The “summer autumn” is a period of prosperity for any nation. For the Russians it was the very active reign of Peter I. The period 1717-1765, on the other hand, brought a “slight frost” and was a time of ineffectual kings and weak governments, but also the time of French rationalism, literature and philosophy. The country lost its enigmatic air, but did not lose its brilliance and charm. Finally came the “spring” period of 1765-1813 including the years leading up to the French Revolution, the Revolution itself and the period of the Napoleonic empire. This period belongs both to the old royal regime of France and to the new bourgeois-republican era. This was the period of French empire in Europe and the export of influence of French culture around the world. At that time France, despite her decisive military defeat, still managed to “re-make” Europe. The protean (deceptively light) French spirit revealed itself in “all its glory” and in the readiness to adopt change. Love of a dissipated and spendthrift king and hatred for the family-oriented king who was if not a saint, then at least an honest man (somewhat like the story of our Nicholas II). Total monarchism was exchanged in the course of seconds for rampant (and just as total) republicanism. Love of peace and enlightenment were exchanged for bloody terror, and dreams of freedom and equality ended in Bonapartism. To a certain degree this feverish time wore out some of the French charm. They managed to cross that fine line beyond which the protean becomes simply betrayal and dynamism reveals a lack of goals.

Conclusions: in 1621-1813 France became the most powerful and attractive European culture but her pretensions to world empire were not born out. Serious problems engendering this spirit arose. The French formula for Catholicism, i.e. the private in the communal (the communal comes not from physical closeness of people and rituals as in the congregation, but from a closeness of ideas and world view) was later revealed in the creation of the communist and socialist dream, in the appearance of the unachievable formula of “freedom, equality and brotherhood,” the very ideology that changed Europe and the world of the 19th and twentieth centuries but turned out to be bankrupt in the twentieth century.

The years 1813-1861 marked a period of the conceptualization of the tumultuous past and the simultaneous conversion of France into a regular state still full of appeal—but not brilliance or power—that would have set her apart from the rest. It was as if France became “common.” In 1861-1905 she continued on this decline. France became subject to greedy, parasitic and swindling capitalism. French communism and socialism also became more trivial. In 1909-1957 France would not be able to muster the impulse to develop, or to attain victory in World War I or World War II, or defeat for that matter. She seemed to go with the flow. In 1957-2005 France became more “boring.” Paris could no longer claim the title of “capital of the world,” and the French city’s glory that was still fresh some 50-70 years ago faded along with the enchantment.

Conclusions: the French spirit, born in the late Middle Ages, exhausted its resources. Along with this France, magnetically attractive in the 16th and 17th centuries and brilliant and powerful in the eighteenth century, gradually lost her magnetism, attraction and power in the 19th and twentieth centuries. The year 2005 will bring in a “new winter” that will threaten the country with further crisis, perhaps in the form of a lack of talent, and possibly subjugation of the nation to Italy or Spain, countries entering into a “long summer.” In the twenty-second century the French will find a new formula for their existence and their spirit. Will this be based on the “Arab influence” predicted by Nostradamus or germanization or something else, truly French? Most likely an original solution will be found and, of course, it will depend on the situation in the twenty-second century. Perhaps the computer revolution will push humans out of the productive sphere, leaving them in the role of controller and distributor of produced wealth that in their economic essence will come to resemble “fruits of the earth.” In this case, people will unite not to produce, but to protect the territories they control and the manufacturing complexes located on these territories. This means that the “political person” will begin to overshadow the “economic person” and, possibly, the community will gain priority over the individual. Then this would certainly be a time of Arab influence. But I don’t think that in the twenty-second century things will be so simple with automatic abundance and groups of people controlling the sources. The human mind will continue to be the key factor of material production, but already in different spheres than in the twentieth century. And the historical tendency for the role of the “political human” to grow to the damage of the current domination of the “economic person” will be one of the main tendencies in the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries. This could mean that the planet could go into another Middle Ages with their inequality, hierarchy and showiness, and quite possibly with their religiosity and idolization of the community. Perhaps in this case the European peoples will move “backwards,” back to God the Father? And this will form a basis for not only the Christians to unite, but for Christians to seek union with the Moslems? After all, they all worship one god, the God of the Old Testament.

X. History and Future of Italy

The history of Italy is older than that of the other European countries—except for Greece—and starts with ancient Rome.

 

Cycle I :

(-299)

Long summer

(-107)

Long autumn

85

Long winter

277

Long spring

469

Cycle II :

469

Long summer

661

Long autumn

853

Long winter

1045

Long spring

1237

CycleIII:

1237

Long summer

1429

Long autumn

1621

Long winter

1813

Long spring

2005

 

The years 501-301 B.C. (the “long spring”) saw the rise of the aristocratic Roman republic, the struggle between the patricians and the plebeians that made society democratic, the rise of the civic community of Rome and the start of consolidating policies, as well as the conquest of a considerable part of the Italian territory. Rome became the premier Italian city. During the “medium winter” of this period Rome survived raids by the Gauls and devastation.

In 299-117 B.C. (the period of the “long summer” of the Roman republic) first Sicily joined the republic, then Sardinia and Corsica, followed by northern Italy, and victory in the Punic Wars was guaranteed. Of course the victories in the second war (the war with Hannibal) cost Rome enormous sacrifices since it was already on the brink of destruction (“medium winter”). Then Rome quickly spread power throughout Italy and in 160-140 B.C. subdued Macedonia and Greece, then added considerable territories of Asia and Africa. The second half of the period saw the hellenization of the Roman republic, mainly in aristocratic circles, but also among the people. By the end of the period this had prompted a fierce struggle between adherents to Roman communal ways and Greek individualism. It was at this time that the Gracchus brothers attempted to restore the rights lost by the plebes.

The new period of 117 B.C. to 85 AD started with the rule of Marius and Sulla who “tried out” the imperial idea. In 89 B.C. all Italians were granted Roman citizenship, and Italy became completely romanized. The beginning of this period (“summer”) ended with the rise of Caesar and a flourishing of the arts (during the rule of Augustus). The last ten years of the period were intense, with Nero’s rule, the stamping out of revolts in Gaul, Judea, Spain and Africa. For the first time a non-aristocratic Roman became emperor (Vespasian).

During the “summer” of 85-277 actual power in the Empire passed to men of provincial origins, and the Romans began to quickly dissolve into the sea of peoples they had conquered. During the period of the “medium winter” chaos engulfed the republic in the form of wars between various armies (the period of so-called “soldier emperors”). The equality of citizens evaporated and society was broken down into nobles and commoners and self-sale of citizens was introduced. By 250 the crisis had reached its culmination, most of the provinces were devastated, and bands of Goths, Francs, Moors and Sarmatians stood at the borders of the empire. In 260 Emperor Valerian was captured by the Persians (this was a humiliation Rome had never known).

But after 280 (a “long spring” had come) the Empire restored its strength and unity. I contest that it was precisely between 229 and 277 that the elite of the romanized peoples of the Roman Empire converted to Christianity, finding in this religion the answers to their most pressing questions. God the Father had to symbolize the communal unification of all peoples of the Empire, and God the Son became the God Man who had paid for the sins of average humans with his suffering. Individualism, whose stormy development brought Roman culture to a dead end, became highly dependent on the community, but was not driven out (!). Men became dependent on the centralized state, and freedom of conscience was strictly limited by religion that had not a personal, but a ritual and communal nature. In 312 Christianity became the official religion. In essence, the Roman national spirit, which during a “long cycle” had become Italian, now became Christian-Italian, a Catholic spirit and further ( in 469-1237) would develop not as a national-religious spirit, but as a religious-national spirit. This second cycle of development of the “Roman spirit” was the spirit of the “Dark Ages” when individualism and everything that leads to it, including urban life, the arts and sciences, were disintegrated. Islam was more consistent. It completely rejected God the Son, expelling him from its dogma, and found ways of making the city and urban culture safe for God, but this is another story. In the European countries individualism was still around, but in a latent form, in the form of recognizing Jesus Christ as God. However, as to the question of his authority, Christianity would split into Western and Eastern forms.

The period from 997 to 1045 was a special period (“medium spring of a long winter”). It was at this time that the nation gave birth to a new values system. What came before this system? Almost an entire century of debauchery on the papal throne and considerable influence from the German emperor on Italian affairs. The period began with the papacy of Sylvester II who, they say, was a prototype of Faust. This period saw the end of the debauchery of the popes themselves and initiated the struggle against the debauchery of the priests. They began to demand observance of celibacy from the priests. Pope Benedict VIII (1012-1024) introduced the Credo into the liturgy, adding the word “filiogue” which emphasized the belief that the Holy Spirit comes from both God the Father and God the Son. This was the birth of modern Catholicism and a new Roman spirit! This discovery was made, but the church reform started a bit later, during the papacy of Leo IX (1049-1054). It was then that Catholicism split completely from Orthodoxy. But the reforms themselves (the Gregorian reforms) were continued in 1073-1085 by Pope Gregory VII. The main goal of these reforms was to create a theocratic empire.

Now let’s attempt to reveal the essence of the national idea of Italy that was formulated during the latter half of the 10th century and achieved during the first half of the 11th century. This was the thesis that the Holy Spirit comes from Christ too (perhaps this was not an Italian but a Spanish or even Franco-German discovery that laid the foundations for the rehabilitation of individualism and formed the basis for the idea of the new theocratic monarchy, a new but now Holy Roman Empire). The seed planted in the fertile soil of Italy and the soil of countries closely connected with her, i.e. France and Germany, soon took root. The fruit of this plant was a new history, and not just for Europe. I won’t describe this third cycle of Italian history, but I will say that 1429-1525 (“medium summer” and “autumn of a long autumn”) was the time of the great Renaissance.

Italy is on the threshold of a new, fourth “long cycle” that will begin in 2005. Should Italy expect new greatness or will this season be blurred as, perhaps, the period of the New Italian “long winter” of 1765-1813 was blurred? What happened then? Perhaps we have discovered the formula for the now powerful Italian Mafia? Most likely, the Italians didn’t formulate any kind of new mission at this time except for the idea of uniting the country. In the end, why think up new formulae if the old ones work? Incidentally, modern Italians are quite different from their predecessors of the 15th and 16th centuries. In what way? We’ve spoken of the French who created a secondary moral authority in the image of Christ. Is this what the Italians did too? Yes, but the God of the Italians is primarily God the Father. The Italians are a more communal people than the French and in the scheme of “community-individualism” they stand somewhere between the French and the Russians. Solidarity (parties, ideas) means less for them. Perhaps even the Catholic Italians are closer in spirit to the Orthodox Russians than to the Catholic French. After all, they started their third “major cycle” of development with the barely perceptible difference in dogmas between Italian (early) Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. The Italians don’t suffer from a love-hate complex toward their state as the Russians do. The strength of the Italian Mafia lies in the strength of the Italian community, the strength of family business is the strength of the community, the communal spirit that has been “trained” in Catholic churches. The Italians did not create the “economic person” as did the Germans, English and Americans, but they did create a “political person” as the French did. Quite possibly they created an “economic” and “political family community” as the Chinese. Evidence of this can be found in aggressive Italian family business (as a support for the “economic” nature of Italians), in the Mafia (as evidence of their communal “politicism”). The Italians work not as well (or more precisely, less successfully and less productively) as the English, Americans and Germans. The Italians do not create a strong state and parties like the French. But they do create good family business and powerful criminal clans (the Mafia, Cosa Nostra) to defend and promote their interests. Might this be the future formula for success in society when the borders are broken down, parties become bureaucratic, and individual talents are brought into very complex production and distribution systems? Perhaps the Mafia will take over from states? This means that I was wrong; Italy did not “miss” her chance at the end of the eighteenth century, but set in motion those mechanisms that would give her serious advantages in the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries.

In any case, the “summer period” in Roman (Italian) history will soon come, people of the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries will witness an amazing transformation in Europe when the center of strength and power moves to Italy and Spain. France will “get lost” and Germany will be pushed to the sidelines.

XI. History and Future of China

Now let’s take a look at Asia. Perhaps the European nations have their own laws that do not apply to Asia, especially to China, which is so far away from Europe. Let’s see.

We’ll consider the history of China from the Confucian period (551-479 B.C.) assuming that he lived during a period of “spring of a long winter.” This means that the “spring of the long winter” would have started in 520 B.C. and ended in 472 B.C. Now let’s look at the Chinese periods:

 

Cycle I :

(-280)

Long summer

(-88)

Long autumn

104

Long winter

296

Long spring

488

Cycle II :

488

Long summer

680

Long autumn

872

Long winter

1064

Long spring

1256

CycleIII:

1256

Long summer

1448

Long autumn

1640

Long winter

1832

Long spring

2024

 

Confucius founded a school based on the filial respect and love of parents for their children. Confucianism sanctified the family community which has tradition instead of God and a rational principle instead of belief. This principle became a belief and a full-fledged religion. The power of the state comes from the power of the family. The true foundation of Chinese culture of the Confucian type is the “family community,” society is built from below, from the family to the village, from the village to the province, from the province to the empire. The highest priority is the small (smallest) community.

It is no accident that the emperors followed his teachings initially. But during the 2nd century B.C. Confucianism became the state religion.

In 255 B.C. China was unified. After a period of struggle in 202 B.C., the country was again united, but until the mid-second century there was still a struggle between the aristocracy and the emperor which, in the end, concluded with the establishment of firm authorities under Emperor Yu-Di (140-187 B.C.). This coincided with a period of “medium spring of a long summer,” i.e. with a period of the country’s greatest flourishing, in particular of its spiritual and material components. This was also the start of a heyday for the arts and sciences, for example Tsima San and others.

During the period of the harshest “autumn-winter” and “double winter” (152-248) there was a great “yellow band revolt” and other revolts, an internecine war and terrifying invasions of the Sunu nomads. This “sacred” period of the formation of the national spirit (248-296) was known for the so-called Triple Kingdom. This period saw the reform of the state bureaucracy, bureaucrats were selected and received high qualifications, and “country categories” were introduced. If previously the state was built from above (and society “wanted” it to be built from below), then now this priority “lower element” became involved in building the state bureaucracy. The “country category” was a kind of attestation for bureaucrats by rural inhabitants. This in effect established the second most significant moral authority after the family, i.e. the authority of the local community.

I will skip over the ensuing periods of the history of China and will only say that “summer” China, in contrast to “winter” Russia, quickly recovered from the consequences of the Mongol invasion and, as opposed to most other countries, was not scorched by the Mongols. I think this wasn’t an accident and that the reason lies in the special enchantment and strength of the “summer culture.” I will draw your attention to the fact that the “winter-spring” period (1928-1976) was a period of revolutions, including the Maoist revolution, and the period of 1976-2024 will become a period of the formation of the “material” component of the national spirit, which we are already witnessing. In future, in the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries “summer China” will be a contender for Eurasian and even world rule. This is only natural for a “summer culture” on the rise.

XII. Conclusions

General methodical conclusions:

The scheme presented in the beginning of this study seems quite convincing when applied to the history of several countries. However, I am not sure that this is a universal law of History. It may be so, but there is obviously not enough “evidence.” I may only say with confidence that such a study will make it possible to take a fresh look at the past and is a tool for predicting the future. So here we have, if not a “law of History,” then at least a useful methodology for studying history and predicting the future.

When researchers manage to “immerse” themselves in the facts, they should sense the rhythm of History, and it is not so important to distinguish whether this is the rhythm of History or only the rhythm of research.

We can offer other schemes (there have probably been many suggested but unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, I don’t have sufficient information). For example, a cycle according to which the “atom” is not a period of three years, but a single day. Thus from one to four days, from four to 16 days, from 16 days to 64 days, from 64 to 256, from 256 to 1024, etc. By the way, 1024 days make up 2.8 years, then not 12 years but 11.2 years, and the next (“small”) cycle contains not 48 years but 44.9 years; the next (“medium”) cycle is not a 192-year cycle, but a 179.5-year cycle, and the next (“long”) cycle is not a 762-year cycle but a 718-year cycle. This is fairly close. Then instead of “seasonal” names “daily” markers will become more appropriate: “morning,” “day,” “evening” and “night.” Perhaps the real lifecycle of a national spirit is somewhere between 718 and 762 years, between “resonance points” of the daily and yearly cycles. This makes the theory more complex, but could make it more accurate. By the way, it is also of some significance that in this case the periods are shifted, which makes it possible to test the hypothesis of the 762-year and 718-year cycles.

In truth, History is cyclical (“it turns!”). In truth, there is such a thing as a Nation Spirit. From the materialistic point of view this is a kind of “quantum condition” of the “collective consciousness” of a certain community that clearly defines the structure of basic relations between individual “sub-I’s” and “super-I’s” of the community itself, as well as the relationship of the communal “sub-I” with the material world and its own past.

Any nation is such a community at its origins (we could say a super-community).

During certain periods of history (we supposed that this would be the “medium spring of a long winter”) the super-community self re-programs itself and passes into a new “quantum condition” corresponding to the accumulated experience of former development and corresponding to its prognosis for the next 600-700 years. The community makes such a prognosis during the time of such a “quantum transition.”

How does this happen? Materially, I think. In places where large groups of people (but not always large ones) gather during religious ceremonies and festivities it is possible that such a job is carried out partially during such public events where the “law of the crowd” rules (for example, at the Agora in Athens). Then this “quantum condition” is transferred to other members of the super-community, it is “contagious” for people of one culture. It is transferred just as it was created, during communal events.

It is precisely ritual that creates and then re-creates this “quantum condition,” is a means of “conjuring spirits,” and a means of actualizing the communal “sub-I.” For this reason, any changes in ritual are always very painful and lead to cardinal changes in the national or national-religious spirit and church schism.

Dogma is just as important as ritual as a key used by reason to “open doors” to the unconscious. In the Main Dogma, i.e. in the super-authority and the religious system built on its basis we find the zone of action not of the collective “sub-I,” but of the collective “I,” the collective unconscious.

This is why religion is the greatest manifestation of the national, communal spirit. This is what connects the collective unconscious to the collective conscious, the collective unconscious and the individual unconscious, and on a national level. But religion can never explain the material world as an objective reality. That is the task of science.

 

Futuristic:

What will determine the central intrigue of world development in the twenty-first and twenty-second centuries? The twenty-first century will see a struggle for world hegemony between China and the United States. Here we must take into account not only the “summer” factor in the new history of China, but also the very number of bearers of the revived Chinese spirit. But another process will be gaining force at the same time, the process of the weakening of state foundations. The process of weakening state foundations (parties, ideologies) and the process of strengthening the elements of the communal-clan and communal-Mafia elements. Some “virtual” states will arise that will possess everything currently born by real states, including finances and power structures. This tendency will gradually transform the competition between the United States and China. From foreign policy competition it will become a domestic policy type of competition, and at one time the Chinese triads will gain considerable weight and influence in the open system of the United States. Europe will see remarkable changes. At the end of the twenty-first century the German industrial and banking circles will no longer be dominant, and will give over to the Italian and Spanish clans, and the new Spanish conquest will be based on the power of Latin America, which is currently a growing “headache” for the United States. Russia will be weak and mostly under Chinese influence, the rest under Indian and European influence. So far I can’t say much about India, which will be a key country in Eurasia, but I can suggest that many Indians will be living in other countries of the world at that time. In Africa, apparently, there will be a conflict-ridden and bloody unification. The Arab countries will survive the current rough “spring” period of the renaissance of Islam and in the struggle against the hegemony of China will by the end of the century create a very strong culture and, quite possibly, a strong Arab state.

During the twenty-second century the state idea will apparently make a comeback, although it is the twenty-second century that will experience a heyday of the “clan element.” It is possible that precisely this will make it possible to avoid nuclear war since the atomic bomb and military might in general are practically useless in the fight against “virtual” states. It is possible that through the fall of national states and virtualization the world really will be able to unite into a single political whole, but in the twenty-third and twenty-fourth centuries.

Not only clans and the Mafia will consolidate their strength over people by pushing out states, parties and ideologies. There will be a new elevation of religions and religious community systems, including sects, orders and churches that will now pretend to unite the world into a theocratic state (the Arabs in the twenty-second century, and the Catholics in the twenty-third century). In the twenty-first and twenty-third centuries Arab elements will develop to an amazing extent, including Islamic religious elements that negate the right of the individual to “self-determination,” and Christianity as the religion of Christ and not of God the Father will undergo an internal decline. The reason will lie in the fact that both religions are in a an anti-phase. Christianity started with the death of Christ in the early first century (beginning of the “long spring”) and Islam from the victorious spread around the world in the early seventh century (beginning of the “long summer”).